Abstract
Farmers need to check the compatibility of soil before transplanting a plant. Similarly, lawmakers need to consider the context of the law recipient country in order to successfully transplant a law. This chapter depicts the economic and legal context of the transplanted Chinese takeover law.
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Notes
- 1.
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), 199.
- 2.
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), 199.
- 3.
The relevant rules will be discussed in detail in Chap. 5.
- 4.
For an overview of the relevant political statement, see Xiaoping Deng, ‘解放思想,实事求是,团结一致向前看 [Emancipate the Mind, Seek the Truth and Get United to Look Forward], Closing Speech on The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, Dec 13, 1978’ (1978).
- 5.
陆一 [Yi Lu], ‘发端股份制 [The Origin of Shareholdings]’, 第一财经日报 [China Finance Newspaper] (Shanghai), Mar 23, 2010.
- 6.
The data is provided by the World Bank Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS [accessed on Jun 1, 2012].
- 7.
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), Preface.
- 8.
姜硕 [Shuo Jiang] and 刘旭 [Xu Liu], ‘上市公司控制权配置与绩效关系研究 [Relations Between Corporate Control and Performance in Listed Companies]’ (2008) 11(2) 中国管理信息化 [China Management Information].
- 9.
See text surrounding note 91, Chap. 5.
- 10.
See text surrounding note 86, Chap. 6.
- 11.
中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定 [Several Major Resolutions by the Central Committee of the CPC on the Reform and Development of State Owned Enterprises], The Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC, Sept 22, 1999. A more recent political statement is referred to in note 12.
- 12.
To be more specific, SOEs should retain absolute control in the seven ‘key industries and crucial areas’, including armaments, power generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation, and shipping. SOEs should carry relatively strong influences in the ‘fundamental and underpinning’ industries, which are less crucial than the first category. The fundamental and underpinning industries include equipment manufacture, automobiles, electric communication, architecture, steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, reconnaissance and design, science and technology. See李荣融 [Rongrong Li], 《关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》答记者问 [Press Release for ‘Guidelines on Enhancing the Restructuring of State Assets and Reorganizing SOEs’] (2006) http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-12/18/content_472256.htm.
- 13.
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), p. 188.
- 14.
Guoxiang Song and G. Meeks, ‘The Convergence of the Chinese and Western Takeover Markets’ (2009) SSRN eLibrary, p. 28; China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), p. 189.
- 15.
中华人民共和国宪法 [Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China), National People’s Congress, promulgated on Dec 4, 1982, Lastly Amended on Mar 14, 2004, art. 7.
- 16.
中华人民共和国企业国有资产法 [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (People’s Republic of China), Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Oct 28, 2008, art. 4.
- 17.
中华人民共和国企业国有资产法 [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (People’s Republic of China), Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Oct 28, 2008, art. 6.
- 18.
Wenkui Zhang, ‘M&A and Restructuring In China’s Capital Markets: Characteristics and Policies’ (2009) (03) China Economist 8.
- 19.
More discussions on insider control in Chinese SOEs can be viewed at K. Lee and D. Hahn, ‘From Insider-Outside Collusion to Insider Control in China’s SOEs’ (2004) 40(2) Issues & Studies 1, pp. 17–34.
- 20.
A few relevant empirical studies can be viewed at 程仲鸣 [Zhongming Cheng] et al., ‘政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资 [Government Intervention, Pyramid Structure and Investment Activities of Local SOEs]’ (2008) (9) 管理世界 [Management World], p. 39;高雷 [Lei Gao], 何少华 [Shaohua He] and 仪垂林 [Chuilin Yi], ‘国家控制、政府干预、银行债务与资金侵占 [State Control, Government Intervention, Bank Debt and Embezzlement]’ (2006) (6) 金融研究 [Journal of Financial Research]; 罗党论 [Danglun Luo] and 唐清泉 [Qianquan Tang], ‘市场环境与控股股东“掏空”行为研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据 [Market Environment and the “Tunneling” Behavior of Controlling Shareholders—The Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies]’ (2007) 4 会计研究 [Accounting Research], pp. 77–78; Yifu Lin and Zhiyun Li, ‘Policy Burden, Moral Hazard and Soft Budget Constraint’ (2004) 2 Economic Research Journal 17; see also Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, ‘Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China’ (2005) 89 Journal of Public Economics, 1743–1762.
- 21.
Money 163.Com, 钢铁重组 [Reorganization in the Steel Industry] (2010) http://money.163.com/special/00253TPG/jd13.html. The report mentioned several government-initiated conglomerations among SOEs, such as the conglomerations between Shandong Gangtie, Jinan Gangtie, and Laizhou Gangtie and the merger between Anshan Gangtie and Benxi Gangtie.
- 22.
钢铁产业发展政策 [Policy on Steel Industry Development] (People’s Republic of China), NDRC, Jul 8, 2005.
- 23.
中华人民共和国公司法 [Company Law of People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China), the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Dec 29, 1993, lastly revised on Oct 27, 2005 (Company Law 2005), art. 4.
- 24.
Company Law 2005, art. 35, 167(4), 187.
- 25.
Company Law 2005, art. 38.
- 26.
Company Law 2005, art. 98.
- 27.
Company Law 2005, art. 98, 103(2), 151.
- 28.
Company Law 2005, art. 103.
- 29.
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Market Development Report (2008), pp. 268–280.
- 30.
The case information is obtained from the company’s public disclosures available on http://www.cninfo.com.cn/information/companyinfo.html [accessed on Jun 4, 2011].
- 31.
Company Law 2005, art. 20(2).
- 32.
Company Law 2005, art. 150, 152 and 153.
- 33.
See 最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 [Certain Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising From False Statement on the Securities Market] (People’s Republic of China) SPC, Jan 9, 2003. Two important barriers include the following: (1) there should be administrative decisions confirming the nature of illegal conducts; (2) except for false disclosure, it is unclear whether courts will hear civil claims originating from insider trading, market manipulation, or others. In a most recent case, the insider trading of Everbright Securities in Aug 2013, courts have refused or delayed hearing the civil claims made by investors. Lei Li, Xinjing Bao, http://money.msn.com.cn/business/20130916/04581611384.shtml [accessed on Sept 20, 2013].
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Chen, J. (2014). Understanding the Context. In: Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54508-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54508-5_2
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