Abstract
Small and medium enterprises occupy a place of utmost importance in the Belgian economy: 92.5 % of the Belgian enterprises employ less than 10 workers, and 98.8 % of them employ less than 50 workers. Convinced that SMEs play a major role in the Belgian economy and that SMEs are key to national economic growth, the current Belgian government is willing to increase SMEs’ competitiveness and alleviate the administrative burden that weighs on them. In order to achieve these objectives, a clear and comprehensive framework on the application of antitrust law to SMEs should be drawn up and made easily available to SMEs, practitioners and scholars.
The original version of this paper was submitted in September 2012 for the LIDC Prague Congress; minor editorial changes were made in June 2013 for publication purpose only.
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Notes
- 1.
Eurostat, Key figures on European business with a special feature on SMEs, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2011, p. 12, table 1.2 (2008).
- 2.
Accord de Gouvernement, 1 December 2011, p. 120, available at http://premier.be/files/20111206/Accord_de_Gouvernement_1er_decembre_2011.pdf.
- 3.
We set aside several competition-law-related definitions that have been adopted by the various Belgian legislators to frame the grant of state aid measures for SMEs. See, for instance, Decreet betreffende een waarborgregeling voor kleine, middelgrote en grote ondernemingen, 6 February 2004, M.B., 20 February 2004, art. 2; Ordonnance organique relative aux aides pour la promotion de l’expansion économique, 13 December 2007, M.B., 10 January 2007, art. 2; Décret relatif aux incitants régionaux en faveur des petites ou moyennes entreprises, 11 March 2004, M.B., 8 April 2004, art. 3. Those norms enacted by the Flemish, Brussels, and Walloon legislative authorities, respectively, directly refer to the SME definition provided in Annex I of EU Regulation No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation), OJ 2008, L 214/3.
- 4.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 15 September 2006, M.B., 29 September 2006.
- 5.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 5 August 1991, M.B., 11 October 1991.
- 6.
Loi relative à la comptabilité et aux comptes annuels des entreprises, M.B., 4 September 1975, Article 12 § 2: “Paragraph 1 applies to enterprises that do not exceed more than one of the following thresholds:
50 employees, on an annual average;
annual turnover (excluding VAT) of 6,250,000 €;
balance sheet total of 3,125,000 €;
except where the number of employees excesses 100 on an annual average.”
- 7.
The relevance of this definition was once supported by M. Waelbroeck and J. Brouckaert in “La loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique”, J.T., 1992, p. 285.
- 8.
Furthermore, several commentators voiced doubts from the very beginning that the definition provided in Article 5 BCA for notification thresholds might not be relevant for Article 2 BCA, which relates to illegal agreements. See S. Plingers, De verhouding tussen Belgisch en Europees kartelrecht, Jura Falconis, 1997–1998, n°4, p. 585.
- 9.
Loi-programme pour la promotion de l’entreprise indépendante, 10 February 1998, M.B., 21 février 1998, Article 2: “For the purpose of the present law:
1° S.M.E.: shall mean enterprises which:
do not employ more than 50 workers on an annual average;
do not have more than 25 % of their stocks or shares in the capital or related voting rights that are owned by one or more enterprises others than SMEs;
and which have an annual turnover not exceeding ECU 7 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding ECU 5 million.
The average number of employed workers on an annual basis is calculated in annual working units, i.e. the number of full-time workers employed during one year, with part-time workers and seasonal workers being counted in fractions of annual working units.
The reference year to take into account is, like for thresholds for annual turnover and balance sheet total, the latest complete approved accounting period.
An enterprise loses its status of S.M.E. when it does not meet the employment criterion, the annual turnover or the balance-sheet total during two successive accounting periods.
Unless the contrary is proved, evidence that the enterprise meets this definition is supposed to be brought by a sworn statement”.
- 10.
Chambre des Représentants, Projet de loi pour la promotion de l’entreprise indépendante, Exposé des motifs, Ordinary session 1996–1997, 24 September 1997, - 1206 / 1–96 / 97, p. 2.
- 11.
Code des sociétés, 7 May 1999, M.B., 6 August 1999, Art. 15 § 1er:
Ҥ1 Small companies are companies with a legal personality which, during the last and second-to-last approved accounting periods, do not exceed one of the following thresholds:
50 employees, on an annual average;
annual turnover (excluding VAT) of EUR 7,300,000;
balance-sheet total of EUR 3,650,000;
except where the number of employed workers, on an annual average, exceeds 100.
§ 2. The application of the criterions listed at § 1 to companies that start their activities is assessed in good faith at the beginning of the accounting period (…)
§ 5. Where a company is linked to one or more others, in the meaning of Article 11, turnover and balance sheet total criterions, as set at §1, are determined on a consolidated basis. Regarding the employed workers criterion, the number of employed workers on an annual average is the addition of the workers employed by each linked company”.
- 12.
G. Zonnekeyn and D. Smeets, “De hervorming van de Belgische mededingingswet: een nieuwe start of een gemiste kans”, RDC-TBH, 2006/9, November 2009, p. 909, footnote 51.
- 13.
Chambre des Représentants, Projet de loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, Avis du Conseil d’Etat, Ordinary session 1989–1990, 10 September 1990, 1282/1 - 89/90, p. 63: “In our legislation “small and mediums entreprises” has, besides, diverse meanings and, since then, does not provide legal certainty”.
- 14.
The EU Recommendation on the definition of SMEs clearly states that the thresholds it defines should be regarded as maximum values and that Member States may fix lower ceilings. See Recommendation 2003/361, Article 2.
- 15.
Voorz. Kh. Brussel, 15 February 1995, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging, 1995, p. 744: “Whereas, pursuant to Art. 5 of the Competition Act of 5 August 1991, legal provisions on restrictive practices do not apply to small and medium enterprises unless the contrary is proved; that the defendant appears to be such company”.
- 16.
Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, 27 October 2008, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging, 2008, p. 891: “Finally, the reference made by the respondent to Article 5 of the BCA is not relevant. Under this article SMEs are conditionally exempted from notification. First, it does not appear that in casu the conditions of Article 5 BCA are met”.
- 17.
See the National Bank of Belgium’s website: http://www.nbb.be.
- 18.
In substance, the Viho ruling states that where an entity exercises a decisive influence on the main decisions of its subsidiary, the two entities should be regarded as one undertaking under antitrust law. See ECJ, case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 1996 I-5457, para. 51.
- 19.
E. Provost, Which, if any, agreements, practices or information exchanges about prices should be prohibited in vertical relationships?, Report of the AEDC (Association pour l’étude du droit de la concurrence – Belgium), LIDC Bordeaux 2010, p. 1, available at http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/2010rapportAbelge.pdf.
- 20.
L. Parret, “La perspective du Conseil de la concurrence”, in N. Petit (dir.), Le Nouveau droit belge de la concurrence. Bilan et perspectives après quatre années d’application, CUP vol. 124, Liège, Anthémis, 2010, p. 293.
- 21.
SPF Economie, Direction Générale de la concurrence, Rapport annuel (2007 à 2010), available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/entreprises/concurrence/Autorite_belge_concurrence_Introduction/Directon_generale_concurrence/.
- 22.
An Annex table was drafted for the realisation of this paper with a detailed report of the cases issued by the NCA. We did not list judicial case law because of the significant grey number unpublished decisions represent.
- 23.
See, for example, Raad van Mededinging, Decision nr. 2008-I/O-04, 25 January 2008, MEDE-I/O-04/0045, Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC), para. 66: “In the present case, where it comes to behaviors that can be attributed to the association, the Council takes into account the statutory maximum, […] % of the turnover of the association, which mainly results from of the membership fees of the bakers”.
- 24.
A similar methodology was used for a similar review. See M. Baillat, “Appendice. L’examen des décisions du Conseil de la concurrence révèle-t-il une influence de la petite taille des entreprises sur la mise en œuvre des règles? Dépouillement des décisions rendues de 1987 à 2006”, in Y. Chaput (dir.) Les PME et le droit de la concurrence. Analyse critique, comparative et perspective, Paris, LexisNexis, 2009, p. 46.
- 25.
SPF Economie, DG Concurrence, Niveaux de prix dans les supermarchés, 13 February 2012, 128 p., available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/etude_niveaux_prix_supermarches_tcm326-163021.pdf.
- 26.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 15 September 2006, Article 2 §1: “Without the need for a prior decision to that effect, all agreements between undertakings, all decisions by associations of undertakings and all concerted practices, the aim or consequence of which is to prevent, restrict or distort significantly competition in the Belgian market concerned or in a substantial part of that market are prohibited (…)”.
- 27.
ECJ, case C-5/69, Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaecke, ECR 1969, p. 295, para. 7.
- 28.
In the Ventouris v Commission case, the General Court held that agreements “to which all the parties are SMEs” fall out of the scope of the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU. CFI, case T-59/99, Ventouris Group Enterprises SA v. Commission, ECR 2003, II-5257. The 1986 version of the de minimis Notice equally assimilated unsignificant market shares with SMEs. See Commission Notice of 3 September 1986 on agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, OJ, 1986, C-231/2, para. 1: “The Commission considers that it is important to facilitate cooperation between firms as long as it is economically desirable and does not raise objections with regard to competition policy, what is specifically of application for small and medium undertakings”.
- 29.
Comm. Bruxelles, 28 January 1994, J.L.M.B., 1994, p. 1262: “Moreover, whatever the market shares held by APT-B and A.M.C., the agreement at stake could not be considered as of minor importance and fall out of the scope of Article [101] since the total turnover of the participating undertakings exceeds ECU 2 hundred million”.
- 30.
European Currency Unit or EUR 200,000.
- 31.
ECJ, case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, ECR 1966, p. 235.
- 32.
Raad voor de mededinging, N.V. L.-D., 25 March 1997, Rechtskundig Weekblad, 1997–1998, n°2, 13 September 1997, p. 53: “Moreover, in accordance with the minimum rule one should not lose sight that the agreement must still be considered in its economic and legal context; it may indeed be part of a network of agreements, so that in the present case the competition may be appreciably reduced.
To assess whether competition is substantially impacted, different criteria can be taken into account, including the turnover criterion, the market shares and the very nature of the anticompetitive agreement itself.”
- 33.
Conseil de la concurrence, Decision n° 2007-I/O-27, 26 October 2007, CONC-I/O-98/0004, E.S./Ordre des pharmaciens; CONC-I/O-98/0024, L.P.D./Ordre des pharmaciens; CONC-I/O-98/0032, Groupe Multipharma/Ordre des pharmaciens, para. 75 and ff.
- 34.
Conseil de la concurrence, Decision n° 2007-P/K-35, 20 December 2007, CONC-P/K-05/0026, F.N.H. / Ordre des pharmaciens - GLEP 30, para. 21.
- 35.
According to us, the limited territory on which the anticompetitive restraint took place cannot in itself explain the rejection of the complaint; the limited size of the undertakings also played a decisive role. In the Canal+ case, a refusal to supply related to a territory of a similar size than the one of the Professional Association of Pharmacists case was said to take place on a substantial part of the Belgian market. True enough, the players here involved were the local incumbent for TV services and Canal+, the main EU pay TV supplier, while pharmacists are more often than not small, independent retailers. Compare Conseil de la concurrence, Decisions n° 2007-I/O-27, n° 2007-P/K-35, and Bruxelles, 18 juin 2004, Canal+ Velgique c. WoluTV et United Pan European Communications Belgium, A&M, 2004/4, p. 357.
- 36.
It is worth noting that the prohibition of abuses of dominance is also limited to those behaviour that take place “on the Belgian market or on a substantial part of it” (Art. 3 BCA).
- 37.
“Even if they have a small market share, undertakings can still appreciably affect competition if, in the light of a number of other elements such as their turnover, production, financial power, technical capacity, etc. they cannot be considered as unimportant undertakings on the relevant market. This may be the case where an undertaking with a small market share belongs to a large group of undertakings that is able to increase its market share in the relatively short term through financial and economic power.” P. Maes, “De minimis non curat praetor en de toepassing van de Wet Bescherming Economische Mededinging. Belgische variaties op een Europees thema?”, note after Raad voor de mededinging, N.V. L.-D., p. 56.
- 38.
From the beginning, the Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance made clear that agreements that are not prohibited under EU law because they do not affect interstate trade may nonetheless be caught under national law. Commission Notice of 3 September 1986 on agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Article 85 paragraph 3 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, OJ, 12 September 1986, C 231/2: “The Commission considers it is important to facilitate cooperation between undertakings to the extent it is economically desirable and that it does not raise objections regarding competition policy, what is particularly true for cooperation between small and medium undertakings.” (no official translation available); J. Bocken and K. De Corte, “La communication du 22 décembre 2011 concernant les accords d’importance mineure qui ne restreignent pas sensiblement le jeu de la concurrence au sens de l’article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité CE”, RDC, 2002, p. 239.
- 39.
The dismissing of a claim on the basis that the anticompetitive behaviour does not affect a substantial part of the Belgian market is less controversial when the geographical portion of the market that is crippled by that conduct represents only a tiny share of the whole, relevant, geographical market. In such a case, consumers still have the opportunity to move towards other suppliers. See, for instance, Prés. Comm. Bruxelles, 30 May 1994, Annuaire Pratiques du commerce & Concurrence, 1994, p. 186, where the anticompetitive conduct took place on the territory of a few municipalities only while the total relevant market was said to be national.
- 40.
To this denial of justice, one might also add the existence of an obvious discrimination between consumers.
- 41.
Gent, 25 May 2005, DAOR, 2005, liv. 76, p. 33.
- 42.
Voorz. Kh. Hasselt, 16 February 2004, RABG, 2004, liv. 11, p. 685.
- 43.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 15 September 2006, Article 2 § 3: “The provisions of § 1 may however be declared inapplicable in the case of:
1° any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
2° any decision or category of decisions of associations of undertakings, and
3° any concerted practice or category of concerted practices which contribute to improving production or distribution or to promoting technical or economic progress or which enable small and medium-sized undertakings to assert their competitive position in the market concerned or internationally, while enabling users to benefit from a fair share of the resulting benefits, without however:
-
a) imposing on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
-
b) giving the undertaking the possibility to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the affected products.”
-
- 44.
“However, it appeared opportune to add an exemption motive for allowing the confirmation of competition agreements such as those that are concluded between small and medium enterprises – in order to allow them to strengthen their competitive position on the Belgian concerned market – and to favour a dispersion of economic operators. This is all the more justified in a national context where the role of small and medium enterprises is relatively more important than in intracommunity trade.” Chambre des Représentants, Projet de loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, Exposé des motifs, Ordinary Session 1989–1990, 10 September 1990, 1282/1 - 89/90, p. 18.
- 45.
G. Zonnekeyn, “De hervorming van de Belgische mededingingswet: een stille (r)evolutie?”, C.J., n° 4/2005, p 72, footnote 15.
- 46.
Conseil de la Concurrence, Avis du Conseil de la concurrence relatif à l’avant-projet de loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique (art. 78 de la Constitution), 29 June 2005, p. 2, available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Advice_art78_fr_tcm326-43331.pdf.
- 47.
J. Stuyck “Restrictieve Mededingingspraktijken”, in J. Stuyck, W. Devroe and P. Wytinck (dir), De nieuwe Belgische Mededingingswet 2006, Mechelen, Kluwer 2007, p. 32.
- 48.
D. Szafran, “La loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique réforme de 1999”, J.T., 2002, n°23, p. 475.
- 49.
Chambre des Représentants, Projet de loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, Avis du Conseil d’Etat, p. 63.
- 50.
The “welfare improvement condition” refers to the need for the agreement to contribute “to improve[e] production or distribution or promoting technical or economic progress”. See D. Gerardin, A. Layne-farrar and N. Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 165.
- 51.
S. Plingers, De verhouding tussen Belgisch en Europees kartelrecht, Jura Falconis, 1997–1998, n°4, p. 585 and ff.; Answer of the Minister for Economy to the question of I. Van Belle, “Concurrence économique. - PME. - Exemption de l’interdiction de cartel”, Q.R., 14 April 1997, B77, p. 10455: “In any event, agreements cannot enclose restrictions that are not indispensable to reach the objectives and cannot allow these undertakings to eradicate competition for a substantial part of the concerned products. Moreover, these agreements must reserve a fair share of profits to users”.
- 52.
S. Plingers, De verhouding tussen Belgisch en Europees kartelrecht, Jura Falconis, 1997–1998, n°4, p. 585 and ff.; P. Eeckman, “Kartelpraktijken”, in P. de Vroede (ed.), Bescherming van de economische mededinging. Wet van 5 augustus 1991, Brugge, Die Keure, 1993, pp. 52–53.
- 53.
Voorz. Kh. Brussel 15 February 1995, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging, 1995, p. 744.
- 54.
Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, 27 October 2008, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging, 2008, p. 891: “Furthermore, Article 5 BCA holds that small and medium-sized enterprises are not free from the obligation to comply with the legislation on competition, this is especially true concerning the prohibition of “hardcore” cartels agreements”.
- 55.
Ibidem.
- 56.
Ibidem.
- 57.
See for instance: Liège, 5 February 2009, Annuaire Pratiques du commerce & Concurrence, 2009, p. 955, note A. Vanderelst, where according to the number of workers and the annual turnover/annual total of the balance sheet that has been published, apparently all companies involved on the oxygenotherapy market have SMEs profiles. According to EU Commission Decision No COMP/M.6504, LINDE / AIR PRODUCTS HOMECARE of 18 April 2012, most of these companies seem to be linked to firms active in other states, though.
- 58.
Regulation 1/2003, Article 3(1).
- 59.
Judicial decisions are of no use here as they only grant or reject the claims of the applicants but do not adapt remedies according to the vicissitudes of the market.
- 60.
Access to the remedy was discussed in access to telephony network cases, what is of little insight for SMEs cases. See for instance: Conseil de la concurrence, Decision n° 2010-L/G-27, 22 July 2010, L/G-07/0015, Mobistar / Belgacom.
- 61.
EU Commission Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission ensures compliance with 2004 Decision against Microsoft”, 22 October 2007, IP/07/1567.
- 62.
Hence, concerning the licensing of interoperability information to an open-source developer (Samba), weeks of negotiations were needed only to determine the exact protocol information that would be included in the license. A. Tridgell, The PFIF Agreement, 20 December 2007, available at http://www.samba.org/samba/PFIF/PFIF_agreement.html.
- 63.
See, for instance, Commission Decision of 21 December 1993, Holyhead, 94/19, OJ, 18 January 1994, L 15/8; Commission decision, 21 December 1993, Rødby, 94/119, OJ, 26 February 1994, L 55/52.
- 64.
See for instance: ECHR, 16 December 1992, No13710/88, Niemietz v. Allemagne, stating that the entitlement of Contracting States to interfere with situations where professional or business activities or premises are involved is more far-reaching than in situations where the domicile of a private individual is involved.
- 65.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 15 September 2006, Article 44.
- 66.
The two portfolios have often been in the hands of the same man. Currently, Vice-Minister Johan VANDE LANOTTE is in charge of the Economy, and Minister Sabine LARUELLE is in charge of SMEs.
- 67.
Loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur, 6 April 2010, M.B., 12 April 2010.
- 68.
Cass. 31 October 2003, RG C.02.0602.F, J.T., 2004, liv. 6127, p. 135.
- 69.
True enough, leniency applications before the NCA are uncommon under Belgian law. For some examples of cartel cases initiated following a leniency applications, see Council Press Release, “Le Conseil de la concurrence impose des amendes pour un cartel dans le secteur chimique”, 4 avril 2008; “Le Conseil de la Concurrence impose des amendes pour un cartel dans le secteur des radiateurs”, 20 mai 2010; “Ententes sur les prix entre les entreprises de manutention dans les ports belges”, 26 avril 2012, available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/entreprises/concurrence/Activites/Actualites_communiques_presse/. Because leniency applications remain unfrequent, no relevant analysis of the order of application according to the size of the applicant is feasible, though.
- 70.
M. Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 147.
- 71.
Communication du Conseil de la concurrence, Lignes directrices sur le calcul des amendes imposées en matière de pratiques restrictives de concurrence en application de l’article 63 de la Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 19 Décembre 2011, para. 21, available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Communication_Lignes_directrices_amendes_tcm326-158194.pdf.
- 72.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 15 September 2006, Articles 63 and 86.
- 73.
Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 5 August 1991, Articles 31 and 36 of the coordinated version of 1st July 1999.
- 74.
Raad van Mededinging, Decision n°2007-I_O-05, 29 January 2007, MEDE-I/O-04/0072, Fedoba; Raad van Mededinging, Decision n°2007-I/O-19, 21 August 2007, MEDE-I/O-00/0027, Orde der Dierenartsen; Raad van Mededinging, Decision n°2008-I/O-04, 25 January 2008, MEDE-I/O-04/0045, Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC); Conseil de la concurrence, Decision, n°2008-P/K-43, 7 July 2008, CONC-I/O-98/0031, ISC c/ FAB et ses membres, CONC-P/K-05/0023, Test-Achats c/ auto-écoles de Belgique.
- 75.
See the stats we publish in L. de Muyter and N. Neyrinck, “Une transaction en droit belge de la concurrence? Approche critique de la proposition de la Direction Générale de la Concurrence”, Revue de droit de la concurrence belge, 2012, n°2-3, pp. 106–118.
- 76.
Whether it is via an express requirement to pay the fine or via an increase of the subscription fees, the sole exception being the situation where the association has sufficient cash reserves to pay the fine.
- 77.
“Moreover, when a fine is inflicted to an association, members may be held liable by the association for the payment of the fine. Yet, in the case at hand, the current number of members is only a tiny proportion of the number of members at the beginning of the instruction. It does not seem justified that current members suffer disproportionate consequences.” Conseil de la concurrence, Decision, n°2008-P/K-43, Test-Achats c/ auto-écoles de Belgique, para. 81.
- 78.
Raad voor de Mededinging, Decision n° 2008-P/K-45, 25 July 2008, MEDE-P/K-06/0006: Review BVBA/Associatie van Interieurarchitecten van België vzw – […], para. 61 and ff.
- 79.
Raad voor de Mededinging, Decision n° 2010-I/O-30, 26 August 2010, CONC – I/O-01/0042: Beroepsinstituut van Vastgoedmakelaars.
- 80.
Formally, NCA decisions first rule out the imposition of a fine because of the unreasonable duration of the investigations and then separately decide to impose publication duties. However, the discretion the NCA enjoys regarding the consequences to give to any kind of breach of Article 6 ECHR may perfectly be instrumentalised to make a trade-off between a fine and a publication decision.
- 81.
Interestingly, much like Regulation 1/2003 (Art. 23(2) and Art. 23(4)4), the Belgian Guidelines for setting fines state that in case of insolvency, associations could be obliged to request the contribution of their members. However, one may question the legality of a rule that would inflict to several undertakings the sanction pronounced against another, distinct legal person. Communication du Conseil de la concurrence, Lignes directrices sur le calcul des amendes imposées en matière de pratiques restrictives de concurrence en application de l’article 63 de la Loi sur la protection de la concurrence économique, 19 Décembre 2011, para. 21, available at http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Communication_Lignes_directrices_amendes_tcm326-158194.pdf, para. 40.
- 82.
Following its fining decision in the elevator cartel case, the Commission sued the cartelists for private damages before Belgian civil courts. To date, this case only led to an interlocutory judgment with several questions asked to the EU Court of Justice. Kh. Brussel, 18 April 2011, RCB, 2011–2, p. 156.
- 83.
One decision was identified as dealing with private damages in Belgium in a 2004 EU survey. This decision does not deal with a cartel case though but with a distribution agreement subsequently declared void. The decision is not published but kept in the NCA’s library. Ashurst, EU DG Competition, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, Report for Belgium, August 2004, p. 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html.
- 84.
This statement should not lead to a too negative view regarding private antitrust enforcement in Belgium. An upsurge of cases may be observed since 2004, with several rulings being issued each year on claims for annulment of anticompetitive contracts or cease and desist orders, if not on cartel damages.
- 85.
As already mentioned above, the track record of the NCA is not tremendous (L. de Muyter and N. Neyrinck, “Une transaction en droit belge de la concurrence ? Approche critique de la proposition de la Direction Générale de la Concurrence”, Revue de droit de la concurrence belge, 2012, n°2-3). Only five cartels have been detected and condemned by the NCA between 2007 and 2011. Thus, in order to encourage private action from SMEs, the NCA should not only communicate more on its results but also investigate and condemn more.
- 86.
Disregard towards market discipline and competition law are often stressed in continental Europe, especially when the introduction of criminal sanctions against antitrust infringement is discussed, with some groups pleading that public moral condemnation is not strong enough to justify such kind of penalties. M. Zuleeg, “Criminal Sanctions to Be Imposed on Individuals as Enforcement Instruments in European Competition law”, 2001 EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, EUIRSCAS, p. 8 (available at http://www.eui.eu/).
- 87.
EU Commission, DG Competition, Draft Guidance Paper − Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty, June 2011, 69 p.
- 88.
Ibidem, para. 5: Some legislators have established presumptions regarding the amount of the damages and allowed a shift of the burden of proof. Another solution could be for the investigation authority to provide an estimation of the cartel’s surplus with the condemnation decision.
- 89.
Compare: Conseil de Concurrence, Décision n’2008-P/K-43, 7 July 2008, aff. CONC-I/O-98/0031, I.S.C./F.A.B. et ses membres (“regarding agreements (…) the obligation to thoroughly delimitate the market at stake does exist only to the extent that this exercise is necessary to determine if the agreement or the decision fulfills the conditions of Article 2 BCA or of Article [10l TFEU]”) and Conseil de la Concurrence, Décision n°2009-P/K-10, 26 May 2009, CONC-P/K-05/0065, Base/ BMB (“In the framework of Article 3 BCA and of Article [102 TFUE], it is essential to define the relevant market to be able to conclude to the existence of a possible dominant position”).
- 90.
Bruxelles, 24 April 2009, Les Editions Urbaines SA / F. Peters, Annuaire Pratiques du commerce & Concurrence, 2009, p. 928.
- 91.
Market definition issues also appeared in ’t Winkelke case, where a small café-bookshop failed to prove the dominance of its press supplier that had terminated its supplies. The court stressed that the burden of proof lied on the applicant before rebutting its claim of abuse for refusal to supply. Voorz. Kh. Kortrijk, 6 February 1995, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging, 1995, p. 722.
- 92.
Bruxelles, 24 April 2009, Les Editions Urbaines SA / F. Peters, Annuaire Pratiques du commerce & Concurrence, 2009.
- 93.
Article 1022 of the Code judiciaire allows courts to correlate the amount of the legal costs with the complexity of the case. See Loi relative à la répétibilité des honoraires et des frais d’avocat, 21 April 2007, M.B., 31 May 2007; Arrêté royal du 26 octobre 2007 fixant le tarif des indemnités de procédure visées à l’article 1022 du Code judiciaire et fixant la date d’entrée en vigueur des articles 1er à 13 de la loi du 21 avril 2007 relative à la répétibilité des honoraires et des frais d’avocat, M.B., 9 November 2007.
- 94.
Cases against SMEs should not be treated as an enforcement priority as it would produce below optimal results regarding the minimal prejudice SMEs are likely to cause to consumers. F. LÉVÊQUE, “Caractéristique des PME et droit de la concurrence: le regard de l’économiste”, in Y. CHAPUT (dir.), Les PME et le droit de la concurrence. Analyse critique, comparative et perspective, Paris, LexisNexis, 2009, p. 46.
- 95.
The spoiling of public money in SMEs v SMEs cases could be minimised though, with public investigations against SMEs targeted to those markets where support for economic analysis is the most needed, in opposition to easy cases – i.e., where prior market definition is provided by past case law, in after-market cases, etc.
- 96.
Regulation 1/2003, Article 15.
- 97.
Interestingly, Article 1022 of the Code judiciaire already authorises courts to take into account the financial capacity of the defeated party to modulate the amount of the indemnity allowed; however, this criterion may be counterbalanced by the complexity of the case, another factor that courts must consider to allocate compensations for legal costs.
- 98.
Code judiciaire, Articles 17 and 18.
- 99.
Loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur, 6 April 2010, M.B., 12 April 2010, Article 113; Loi concernant le règlement de certaines procédures dans le cadre de la loi du 6 avril 2010 relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur, 6 April 2010, M.B., 12 April 2010, Article 2. The cease and desist action available under unfair competition law may be invoked to bring cease and desist proceedings against anticompetitive behaviour. D. Gérard, “Le droit belge des pratiques restrictives de concurrence” in N. Petit (dir.), Le nouveau droit belge de la concurrence. Bilan et perspectives après quatre années d’application, CUP n°124, Liège, Anthémis, 2010, p. 30.
- 100.
The procedure before the NCA being an objective procedure, complaints before the NCA are open for any natural or legal person. Hence, contrary to the limitations they know before civil courts, consumer’s associations may introduce a complaint before the NCA without having to demonstrate any kind of personal interest. See Conseil de la concurrence, Decision, n°2008-P/K-43, Test-Achats c/ auto-écoles de Belgique.
- 101.
Ashurst, EU DG Competition, EU DG Competition, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, Report for Belgium, August 2004, p. 3.
- 102.
M. Piers, “Class actions”, Nieuwe Juridische Weekblad, 2007, pp. 825 et s.
- 103.
We observe that, while NCA case law primarily focuses on the decisions of professional associations, judicial case law mainly deals with supplier–buyer issues. This observation is also made by D. Gérard, “Le droit belge des pratiques restrictives de concurrence”, in N. Petit (dir.), Le nouveau droit belge de la concurrence. Bilan et perspectives après quatre années d’application, CUP n°124, Liège, Anthémis, 2010, p. 66.
- 104.
Loi relative à la résiliation unilatérale des concessions de vente exclusive à durée indéterminée, 27 July 1961, M.B., 5 October 1961.
- 105.
Loi relative à l’information précontractuelle dans le cadre d’accords de partenariat commercial, 19 December 2005, M.B., 18 January 2006.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Nicolas Petit, Marc Abenhaim, Laurent Demuyter, Charlotte Lousberg, and Elise Provost for their insights and remarks. The author is especially indebted to Pierre Sabbadini, who provided great research assistance in the early preparation of this paper. Translations of Belgian legal texts and case law are mine, with any error that may come with it.
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Neyrinck, N. (2014). Belgium. In: Këllezi, P., Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P. (eds) Antitrust for Small and Middle Size Undertakings and Image Protection from Non-Competitors. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54000-4_3
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