Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Logisches Denken

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Allgemeine Psychologie

Zusammenfassung

Als „logisch“ bezeichnet man ein Denken, das bei Abwägung der verfügbaren Informationen als folgerichtig und widerspruchsfrei gelten kann. Beim sicheren logischen Schließen ist eine Schlussfolgerung sicher wahr, wenn man von wahren Voraussetzungen ausgeht. Beim unsicheren logischen Schließen können Schlüsse auch möglich, plausibel oder wahrscheinlich sein. Bei der Bewertung solcher Schlüsse wird auf Rationalitätsnormen Bezug genommen. Empirische Befunde zeigen, dass sich Menschen oft an diese normativen Vorgaben halten, aber manchmal auch von diesen Sollwerten abweichen. Die Theorien, die diese Abweichungen erklären wollen, werden diskutiert und ihre neuronalen Grundlagen dargestellt. Es werden außerdem einige wichtige Fragen des Forschungsgebiets diskutiert. Dabei geht es auch um die Beziehung zwischen logischem Denken und Rationalität und die Frage, was als vernünftiges Denken, Argumentieren, Urteilen und Entscheiden gelten soll.

Schlüsselwörter: Logik; Rationalität; Denken; Argumentation; Deduktion; Konditionales Schließen; Relationales Schließen; Syllogismen; Nichtmonotones Schließen; Logisches Gehirn

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Literatur

  • Adams, E. W. (1975). The logic of conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, E. W. (1998). A primer of probability logic. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andersen, R. A. (1997). Multimodal integration for the representation of space in the posterior parietal cortex. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 352, 1421–1428.

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, J. R. (1990). The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, N.J: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, J. R. (1991). Is human cognition adaptive? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 14, 471–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50, 510–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allwein, G., & Barwise, J. (1996). Logical reasoning with diagrams. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Antoniou, G. (1997). Nonmonotonic reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bäcker, C. (2010). Rules, principles, and defeasibility. In M. Borowski (Hrsg.), On the Nature of Legal Principles. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bagusche, S. (2013). Einführung in die nicht-sprachliche Logik. Frankfurt: Ontos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bara, B. G., Bucciarelli, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1995). Development of syllogistic reasoning. The American Journal of Psychology, 108(2), 157–193.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Barwise, & Etchemendy, J. (1994). Hyperproof. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bauer, M. I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). How diagrams can improve reasoning. Psychological Science, 4, 372–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Causes and treatment. Philadelphia. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beierle, C., & Kern-Isberner (2008). Methoden wissensbasierter Systeme – Grundlagen, Algorithmen, Anwendungen. Wiesbaden: Vieweg+Teubner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Begg, I. (1987). Some. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 41, 62–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Begg, I., & Harris, G. (1989). On the interpretation of syllogisms. Journal of Verbal Learning and Learning Behaviour, 21, 595–620.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, V. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1998). A model theory of modal reasoning. Cognitive Science, 22(1), 25–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beller, S., & Spada, H. (2003). The logic of content effects in propositional reasoning: The case of conditional reasoning with a point of view. Thinking and Reasoning, 9(4), 335–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005). Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment (S. 148–152). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Blanchette, I. (2013). Emotion and reasoning. UK: Hove: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blanchette, I., Richards, A., Melnyk, L., & Lavda, A. (2007). Reasoning about emotional contents following shocking terrorist attacks: A tale of three cities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 13, 47–56.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Blanchette, I., Lindsay, P., & Davies, S. (2008). Conditional reasoning about highly emotional events: Victims of sexual abuse. 6th International Conference on Thinking, Venice, Italy, August 21 – 23 2008.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonatti, L. (1994). Why should we abandon the mental logic hypothesis? Cognition, 50(1), 17–39.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Bonnefon, J.-F., & Hilton, D. J. (2001). Formalizing human uncertain reasoning with default rules: A psychological conundrum and a pragmatic suggestion. In. ECSQARU ’01 Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty. (S. 628–634). Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boole (1854). 1953). An investigation of the laws of thought. New York: Dover Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braine, M. D., & O’Brien, D. P. (1991). A theory of if: A lexical entry, reasoning program, and pragmatic principles. Psychological Review, 98, 182–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braine, M. D. S., & O’Brien, D. P. (1998). Mental logic. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewka, G. (1991). Cumulative default logic: In defense of non-monotonic inference rules. Artificial Intelligence, 50(2), 183–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Butcher, J. N., Mineka, S., & Hooley, J. M. (2009). Klinische Psychologie. München: Pearson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R. M. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31, 61–83.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R. M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1989). Spatial reasoning. Journal of Memory & Language, 28, 564–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza, A., Gordon, J., Zurif, E. B., & De Luca, D. (1976). Right hemispheric damage and verbal problem solving behavior. Brain and Language, 3, 41–46.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Ceraso, J., & Profitera, A. (1971). Sources of error in syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 2, 400–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, D., & Chua, F. (1994). Suppression of valid inferences: Syntactic views, mental models, and relative salience. Cognition, 53, 217–238.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1959). Atmosphere effect re-examined. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 220–226.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Chase, V. M., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Visions of rationality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 206–214.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999). The probability heuristic model of syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 38(2), 191–258.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 391–416.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, H. H. (1969). Linguistic processes in deductive reasoning. Psychological Review, 76, 387–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, D. A., Beck, A. T., & Alford, B. A. (1999). Scientific foundations of cognitive theory and therapy of depression. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clement, C. A., & Falmagne, R. J. (1986). Logical reasoning, world knowledge, and mental imagery: Interconnections in cognitive processes. Memory & Cognition, 14, 299–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4(3), 317–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31, 187–276.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Craik, K. (1943). The Nature of Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins, D. D. (1995). Naive theories and causal deduction. Memory & Cognition, 23, 646–658.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cummins, D. D., Lubart, T., Alksnis, O., & Rist, R. (1991). Conditional reasoning and causation. Memory & Cognition, 19, 274–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demeure, V., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Raufaste, E. (2009). Politeness and conditional reasoning: Interpersonal cues to the indirect suppression of deductive inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 260–266.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • De Neys, W. (2014). Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 169–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Neys, W., Schaeken, W., & d’Ydewalle, G. (2003a). Inference suppression and semantic memory retrieval: Every counterexample counts. Memory & Cognition, 31, 581–595.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Neys, W., Schaeken, W., & d’Ydewalle, G. (2003b). Causal conditional reasoning and strength of association: The disabling condition case. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 15, 161–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Neys, W., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2008). Smarter than we think: When our brains detect that we are biased. Psychological Science, 19, 483–489.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Dickstein, L. S. (1978). The effect of figure on syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 6, 76–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dietz, E.-A., Hölldobler, S., & Ragni, M. (2012). A computational logic approach to the suppression task. In N. Miyake, D. Peebles, & R. P. Cooper (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (S. 1500–1505). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dietz, E.-A., Hölldobler, S., & Ragni, M. (2013). A computational logic approach to the abstract and the social case of the selection task. Proceedings Eleventh International Symposium on Logical Formalizations of Commonsense Reasoning.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dieussaert, K., Schaeken, W., De Neys, W., & d’Ydewalle, G. (2000). Initial belief state as a predictor of belief revision. Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition, 19(3), 277–288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-dialected approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Spatial descriptions and referential continuity. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 296–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elio, R., & Pelletier, F. J. (1997). Belief change as propositional update. Cognitive Science, 21(4), 419–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elqayam, S., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (2011). Subtracting ‘ought’ from ‘is’: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 233–248.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Elqayam, S., & Over, D. (2012). Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: The paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning. Mind and Society, 11(1), 27–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1977). Linguistic factors in reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29, 297–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1989). Bias in human reasoning. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1993a). The mental model theory of conditional reasoning: Critical appraisal and revision. Cognition, 48(1), 1–20.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1993b). Bias and rationality. In K. I. Manktelow, & D. E. Over (Hrsg.), Rationality. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 978–996.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454–459.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2012). Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 18, 5–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T., Newstead, S. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Human reasoning. The psychology of deduction. Hove (UK): Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T., Handley, S. H., & Over, D. E. (2003). Conditionals and conditional probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 321–355.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Anxiety and cognitive-task performance. Personality and Individual Differences, 6, 579–586.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eysenck, M. W., & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing efficiency theory. Cognition & Emotion, 6, 409–434.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feather, N. T. (1964). Acceptance and Rejection of Arguments in relation to attitude strength, critical ability, and intolerance of inconsistency. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69, 127–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fine, C. (2011). Zielorientiertes Integrationsmodell – ein kognitives Therapiemodell für die Behandlung der dissoziativen Identitätsstörung. In L. Reddemann, A. Hofmann, & U. Gast (Hrsg.), Psychotherapie der dissoziativen Störungen 3. Aufl. Stuttgart: Thieme.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, G. (1994). Modern logic: A text in elementary symbolic logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ford, M., & Billington, D. (2000). Strategies in human nonmonotonic reasoning. Computational Intelligence, 16(3), 349–4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1879/1993). Begriffsschrift. In Angelelli, I. (Hrsg.), Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze.Hildesheim: Olms Georg AG.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freksa, C. (1992). Temporal reasoning based on semi-intervals. Artificial Intelligence, 54, 199–227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friederici, A. D. (2012). The cortical language circuit: From auditory perception to sentence comprehension. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(5), 262–268.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gallotti, M., & Frith, C. D. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends in cognitive sciences, 17(4), 160–165.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. (1992). Belief revision: An introduction. In P. Gärdenfors (Hrsg.), Belief revision (S. 1–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1988). Revisions of knowledge systems using epistemic entrenchment. Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge. (S. 83–95). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc..

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P., & Rott, H. (1995). Belief revision. In D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, & J. A. Robinson (Hrsg.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligenceand Logic Programming (Bd. IV, S. 35–132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. (1994). Thinking and reasoning. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2012). Cognitive consistency: A fundamental principle in social cognition. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gazzo Castaneda, L. E., & Knauff, K. (2016a). Defeasible reasoning with legal conditionals. Memory & Cognition, 44(3), 499–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gazzo Castaneda, L. E., & Knauff, K. (2016b). When will is not the same as should the role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(8), 1480–1497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009). Homo heuristicus: Why biased minds make better inferences. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(1), 107–143.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer, G., & Hug, K. (1992). Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change. Cognition, 43(2), 127–171.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (2002). Bounded Rationality. The adaptive toolbox. London: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., & Pachur, T. (Hrsg.). (2011). Heuristics: The foundations of adaptive behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goel, V. (2007). Anatomy of deductive reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 435–441.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief. Cognition, 87(1), 11–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goel, V., Gold, B., Kapur, S., & Houle, S. (1998). Neuroanatomical correlates of human reasoning. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 293–302.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Golding, E. (1981). The effect of unilateral brain lesion on reasoning. Cortex, 17, 31–40.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds. The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2005). Reasoning about relations. Psychological Review, 112, 468–493.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, R. L. (1953). The effect of attitude toward Russia on logical reasoning. Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 103–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Görz, G., Schneeberger, J., & Schmid, U. (Hrsg.). (2013). Handbuch der Künstlichen Intelligenz (5. Aufl.). München: Oldenbourg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan (Hrsg.), Speech acts Syntax and semantics, (Bd. III, S. 41–58). New York: Seminar Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griggs, R. A., & Cox, J. R. (1982). The elusive thematic-materials effect in Wason’s selection task. British Journal of Psychology, 73, 407–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griggs, R. A., & Cox, J. R. (1993). Permission schemas and the selection task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A, 637–651.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. (2004). Freiheit und Determinismus. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 52(6), 871–890.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Book.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasson, U., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2003). Why believability cannot explain belief revision. In R. Alterman, & D. Kirsh (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinterecker, T., Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2016). Modality, probability, and mental models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/xml0000255.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hölldobler, S., & Ramli, C. D. P. K. (2009). Logics and networks for human reasoning. In Artificial Neural Networks-ICANN 2009 (S. 85–94). Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hunter, I. M. L. (1957). The solving of three-term series problems. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 286–298.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Jahn, G., Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2007). Preferred mental models in reasoning about spatial relations. Memory & Cognition, 35, 2075–2087.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Janis, I. L., & Frick, F. (1943). The relationship between attitudes toward conclusions and errors in judging logical validity of syllogisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 33, 73–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jeffrey, R. (1981). Formal logic: Its scope and limits (2. Aufl.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972). The three-term series problem. Cognition, 1, 57–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1995). Mental models, deductive reasoning, and the brain. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Hrsg.), The cognitive neurosciences (S. 999–1008). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1998). Imagery, visualization, and thinking. In J. Hochberg (Hrsg.), Perception and Cognition at Century’s End (S. 441–467). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Deductive reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 109–135.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 8, 69–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How we reason. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Mental models and human reasoning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 10718243–18250

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Bara, B. G. (1984). Syllogistic inference. Cognition, 16, 1–61.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Savary, F. (1999). Illusory inferences: a novel class of erroneous deductions. Cognition, 7, 191–229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Steedman, M. (1978). The psychology of syllogisms. Cognitive Psychology, 10, 64–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Wason, P. C. (1970). A theoretical analysis of insight into a reasoning task. Cognitive Psychology, 1, 134–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laid, P. N., Legrenzi, P., & Legrenzi, M. S. (1972). Reasoning and a sense of reality. British journal of Psychology, 63(3), 395–400.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, M. S. (2000). Illusions in reasoning about consistency. Science, 288(5465), 531–532.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P. (2004). Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency. Psychological Review, 111, 640–661.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2006). A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesses. Psychological review, 113(4), 822–841.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Jong, P. J. de, Mayer, B., & Hout, M. A. van den (1997). Conditional reasoning and phobic fear: evidence for a fear-confirming reasoning pattern. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 35, 507–516.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jung, N., Wranke, C., Hamburger, K., & Knauff, M. (2014). How emotions affect logical reasoning: Evidence from experiments with mood-manipulated participants, spider phobics, and people with exam anxiety. Frontiers in Emotion Science, 5, 1–12. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00570.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman (2012). Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken. München: Siedler.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Hrsg.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kern, L. H., Mirels, H. L., & Hinshaw, V. G. (1983). Scientists’ understanding of propositional logic: an experimental investigation. Social Studies of Science, 13, 131–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khemlani, S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2011). The need to explain. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64, 2276–2288.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khemlani, S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Theories of the syllogism: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 427–457.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (2007). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Naumer, B. (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 107, 852–884.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Klauer, K. C., Beller, S., & Hütter, M. (2010). Conditional reasoning in context: a dual-source model of probabilistic inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36(2), 298.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Kleene, S. (1952). Introduction to Metamathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (1999). The cognitive adequacy of Allen’s interval calculus for qualitative spatial representation and reasoning. Spatial Cognition and Computation, 1, 261–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (2006). Deduktion und logisches Denken. In J. Funke (Hrsg.), Denken und Problemlösen Enzyklopädie der Psychologie, Themenbereich C, (Bd. 8, S. 167–264). Göttingen: Hogrefe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (2007). How our brains reason logically. Topio, 26, 19–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (2009). A neuro-cognitive theory of deductive relational reasoning with mental models and visual images. Spatial Cognition and Computation, 9(2), 109–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (2013a). Space to reason. A spatial theory of human thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M. (2013b). Uncertain spatial reasoning about environmental hazards. Invited talk. Workshop „Knowledge, beliefs, representations in understanding climate issues“ Paris Consortium Climate-Environment-Society and laboratory Paragraphe. Paris: CNRS. http://www.gisclimat.fr/en/feedback-workshop-knowledge-beliefs-representations-understanding-climate-issues

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Visual imagery can impede reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 30, 363–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., & May, E. (2006). Mental imagery, reasoning, and blindness. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59, 161–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Rauh, R., & Schlieder, C. (1995). Preferred mental models in qualitative spatial reasoning: A cognitive assessment of Allen’s calculus. In J. F. Lehman, & J. D. Moore (Hrsg.), Proc. of the 17th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (S. 200–205). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Rauh, R., Schlieder, C., & Strube, G. (1998). Continuity effect and figural bias in spatial relational inference. Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (S. 573–578). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Mulack, T., & Johnson, M. K. (2000). The neural substrates of spatial thinking: Results from an experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Poster presented at Seventh Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Neuroscience Society, San Francisco, CA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Mulack, T., Kassubek, J., Salih, H. R., & Greenlee, M. W. (2002). Spatial imagery in deductive reasoning: A functional MRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 13, 203–212.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Fangmeier, T., Ruff, C. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2003). Reasoning, models, and images: Behavioral measures and cortical activity. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15, 559–573.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Budeck, C., Wolf, A. G., & Hamburger, K. (2010). The illogicality of stockbrokers: Psychological experiments on the effects of prior knowledge and belief biases on logical reasoning in stock trading. PLoS ONE, 5(10), e13483. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013483.

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  • Knauff, M., Bucher, L., Krumnack, A., & Nejasmic, J. (2013). Spatial belief revision. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 25(2), 147–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kneale, W., & Kneale, M. (1962). The development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kowalski, R. (2011). Computational logic and human thinking: how to be artificially intelligent. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artifcial Intelligence, 44, 167–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krems, J., & Bachmaier, M. (1991). Hypothesenbildung und Strategieauswahl in Abhängigkeit vom Expertisegrad. Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 38(3), 394–410.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krems, J. F., & Zierer, C. (1994). Sind Experten gegen kognitive Täuschungen gefeit? Zur Abhängigkeit des confirmation bias von Fachwissen. Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 41(1), 98–115.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1963). Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16, 83–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhnmünch, G., & Ragni, M. (2014). Can formal non-monotonic systems properly describe human reasoning? In P. Bello, M. Guarini, M. McShane, & B. Scassellati (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (S. 1222–1228). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landau, B., & Jackendoff, R. (1993). ’’What’’ and ’’where’’ in spatial language and spatial cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 217–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewandowsky, S. (2016). Future global change and cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science, 8(1), 7–18.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Lewandowsky, S., Oberauer, K., & Gignac, G. E. (2013). NASA faked the moon landing therefore (climate) science is a hoax: An anatomy of the motivated rejection of science. Psychological Science, 24, 622–633.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacLeod, C., & Donnellan, A. M. (1993). Individual differences in anxiety and the restriction of working memory capacity. Personality and Individual Differences, 15, 163–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahony, M. J. (1976). Scientist as subject: The psychological imperative. Cambridge: Ballinger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manktelow, K. (1999). Reasoning and thinking. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marcus, S. L., & Rips, L. J. (1979). Conditional reasoning. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 18, 199–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markovits, H. (1988). Conditional reasoning, representation, and empirical evidence on a concrete task. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40(3), 483–495.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markovits, H., & Potvin, F. (2001). Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: The curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals. Memory & Cognition, 29, 736–744.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain sciences, 34, 57–74.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (2007). Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes, Bd. 2. Paderborn: mentis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, G. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mynatt, C. R., Doherty, M. E., & Tweney, R. D. (1978). Consequences of confirmation and disconfirmation in a simulated research environment. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 30(3), 395–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nejasmic, J., Bucher, L., & Knauff, M. (2015). The construction of spatial mental models – A new view on the continuity effect. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68(9), 1794–1812. doi:10.1080/17470218.2014.991335.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neves, R. D. S., Bonnefon, J. F., & Raufaste, E. (2002). An empirical test of patterns for nonmonotonic inference. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 34(1–3), 107–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oakhill, J., Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Garnham, A. (1989). Believability and Syllogistic Reasoning. Cognition, 31(2), 117–140.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (1994). A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. Psychological Review, 101, 608–631.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian rationality the probabilistic approach to human reasoning. New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2014). Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 269–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oaksford, M., & Hahn, U. (2007). Induction, deduction and argument strength in human reasoning and argumentation. In A. Feeney, & E. Heit (Hrsg.), Inductive reasoning: Experimental, developmental and computational approaches (S. 269–301). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Openproof Research (2015).. https://ggweb.gradegrinder.net/openproof/HetReasoninghptour3. Zugegriffen: 16.Oktober 2015

  • Osherson, D. N. (1976). Reasoning and concepts. Logical abilities in children, Bd. 4. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Over, D. E. (2009). New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 15, 431–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Over, D. E., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). The probability of conditionals: The psychological evidence. Mind and Language, 18, 340–358.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: Networks of plausible inference. San Mateo, Calif: Morgan Kaufmann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peirce, C. S. (1931–1958). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. In: C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, & A. Burks (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2005). Coherence and nonmonotonicity in human reasoning. Synthese, 146(1–2), 93–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basil Books, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polk, T. A., & Newell, A. (1995). Deduction as verbal reasoning. Psychological Review, 102, 533–566.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L. (1987). How to build a person: the physical basis for mentality. Philosophical Perspectives, 1(Metaphysics), 109–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Politzer, G., & Carles, L. (2001). Belief revision and uncertain reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 7(3), 217–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1968). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchison.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pouget, A., Beck, J. M., Ma, W. J., & Latham, P. E. (2013). Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns. Nature Neuroscience, 16(9), 1170–1178.

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  • Prado, J., Chadha, A., & Booth, J. R. (2011). The brain network for deductive reasoning: a quantitative meta-analysis of 28 neuroimaging studies. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3483–3497.

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  • Ragni, & Knauff, M. (2013). A theory and a computational model of spatial reasoning with preferred models. Psychological Review, 120, 561–588.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Ragni, M., & Wölfl, S. (2005). Temporalizing spatial calculi: On generalized neighborhood graphs. In U. Furbach (Hrsg.), KI 2005: Advances in Artificial Intelligence Proceedings of the 28th Annual German Conference on AI. (S. 64–78). Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ragni, M., Franzmeier, I., Maier, S., & Knauff, M. (2016). Uncertain relational reasoning in parietal cortex. Brain & Cognition, 4, 72–81. Im Druck

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramsey, F. P. (1990). General propositions and causality. In D. H. Mellor (Hrsg.), Philosophical Papers (S. 145–163). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.. Original Publikation, 1929

    Google Scholar 

  • Rauh, R. (2000). Strategies of constructing preferred mental models in spatial relational inference. In W. Schaeken, G. De Vooght, A. Vandierendonck, & G. d’Ydewalle (Hrsg.), Deductive reasoning and strategies (S. 177–190). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rauh, R., Hagen, C., Knauff, M., Kuß, T., Schlieder, C., & Strube, G. (2005). From preferred to alternative mental models in spatial reasoning. Spatial Cognition and Computation, 5(2&3), 239–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Read, D. E. (1981). Solving deductive-reasoning problems after unilateral temporal lobectomy. Brain and Language, 12, 116–127.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. Artificial intelligence, 13(1), 81–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reiter, R. (1987). Nonmonotonic reasoning. Annual review of computer science, 2(1), 147–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Revlis, R. (1975). Two models of syllogistic inference: Feature selection and conversion. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14, 180–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Revlis, R., Lipkin, S. G., & Hayes, J. R. (1971). The importance of universal quantifiers in a hypothetical reasoning task. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10, 86–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richardson, J. T. E. (1987). The role of mental imagery in models of transitive inference. British Journal of Psychology, 78, 189–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof: Deductive reasoning in human thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rott, H. (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rumain, B., Connell, J., & Braine, M. D. (1983). Conversational comprehension processes are responsible for reasoning fallacies in children as well as adults: If is not the biconditional. Developmental Psychology, 19, 471–481.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, P. (2010). Logik vs. Interesse: Der Einfluss des domänenspezifischen Interesses auf das konditionale Schließen. Unveröffentlichte Diplomarbeit. Gießen: Universität Gießen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schöning, U. (2000). Logik für Informatiker. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schroyens, W. (2010). Logic and/in Psychology: The paradoxes of material implication and psychologism in the cognitive science of human reasoning. In M. Oaksford, & N. Chater (Hrsg.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and logic in human thought (S. 69–84). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G. (2005). Non-monotonic reasoning from an evolutionary viewpoint. Synthese, 146(1–2), 37–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shafir, E., Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1993). Reason-based choice. Cognition, 49(1), 11–36.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Skipper, J. I. (2015). The NOLB model: a model of the natural organization of language and the brain. In R. M. Willems (Hrsg.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Natural Language Use (S. 101–134). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Spohn, W. (1993). Wie kann die Theorie der Rationalität normativ und empirisch zugleich sein? In L. Eckensberger, & U. Gähde (Hrsg.), Ethik und Empirie. Zum Zusammenspiel von begrifflicher Analyse und erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Forschung in der Ethik (S. 151–196). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spohn, W. (2001). Die vielen Facetten der Rationalitätstheorie. In U. Arnswald, & H.-P. Schütt (Hrsg.), Rationalität und Irrationalität in den Wissenschaften (S. 138–159). Wiesbaden: VS.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaver, P., Pierson, L., & Lang, S. (1975). Converging evidence for the functional significance of imagery in problem solving. Cognition, 3, 359–375.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shin, S. (1994). The logical status of diagrams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. (1959). Theories of decision making in economics and behavioural science. American Economic Review, 49, 253–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stenning, K. (2002). Seeing reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stenning, K., & Lambalgen, M. van (2008). Human reasoning and cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sternberg, R. J. (1980). Representation and process in linear syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 119–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stevenson, R. J., & Over, D. E. (1995). Deduction from uncertain premises. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A, 613–643.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Störring, G. (1908). Experimentelle Untersuchungen über einfache Schlussprozesse. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 11, 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taplin, J. E. (1971). Reasoning with conditional sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 10, 219–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tenbrink, T., & Ragni, M. (2012). Linguistic principles for spatial relational reasoning. In C. Stachniss, K. Schill, & D. H. Uttal (Hrsg.), Spatial Cognition VIII: Proceedings of International Conference, Spatial Cognition 2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Bd. 7463, S. 279–298). Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M. (2009). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toulmin, S. E. (1996). Der Gebrauch von Argumenten (2. Aufl.). Weinheim: Beltz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tweney, R. D., et al. (1980). Strategies of rule discovery in an inference task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 109–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uttal, W. R. (2001). The new phrenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van der Henst, J.-B. (2002). Mental model theory versus the inference rule approach in relational reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 8(3), 193–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, C. R., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2009). Changing your mind. Memory & Cognition, 37(5), 624–631.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wason, P. C. (1966). Reasoning. In B. M. Foss (Hrsg.), New horizons in psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wason, P. C. (1977). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses ... A second look. In P. N. Johnson-Laird, & P. C. Wason (Hrsg.), Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wharton, C. M., Cheng, P. W., & Wickens, T. D. (1993). Hypothesis-testing strategies: Why two goals are better than one. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology, 46A, 743–758.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitaker, H. A., Markovits, H., Savary, F., Grou, C., & Braun, C. (1991). Inference deficits after brain damage. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 13, 38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, A. G., Rieger, S., & Knauff, M. (2012). The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision. Thinking & Reasoning, 18(4), 417–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodworth, R. S., & Sells, S. B. (1935). An atmosphere effect in formal syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18, 451–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wundt, W. (1910). Psychologismus und Logizismus. Kleine Schriften, Bd. 1, S. 511–634). Leipzig: Engelmann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8, 338–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fachbereich 06, Allgemeine Psychologie und Kognitionsforschung, Universität Gießen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, 35394, Gießen, Deutschland

    Prof. Dr. Markus Knauff

  2. Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, October 6 street 7, 1051, Budapest, Ungarn

    Prof. Dr. Günther Knoblich

Authors
  1. Prof. Dr. Markus Knauff
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Prof. Dr. Günther Knoblich
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Markus Knauff .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Psychologie, RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany

    Jochen Müsseler

  2. UMIT – Private Universität für Gesundheitswissenschaften, Medizinische Informatik und Technik, Institut für Psychologie, Hall in Tirol, Austria

    Martina Rieger

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Knauff, M., Knoblich, G. (2017). Logisches Denken. In: Müsseler, J., Rieger, M. (eds) Allgemeine Psychologie. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-53898-8_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-53898-8_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-53897-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-53898-8

  • eBook Packages: Psychology (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation