Abstract
The standard assumption in the group choice theory states that the individuals in the group have complete (connected) and transitive preference relations over the set of alternatives. In this paper we shall consider some alternatives to this assumption in an effort to find out whether a theory of group choice could be built on non-conventional basic assumptions concerning individual attitudes towards options from which the group has to make a choice. We shall be dealing with a specific class of group choice procedures, viz. voting procedures (VP’s, for short). These are commonly used in determining the “socially best” alternatives either with or without preference ranking between them (for a description and analysis of the VP’s mentioned in this paper, see Nurmi [6] and Riker [8]).
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References
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Nurmi, H. (1988). Assumptions of Individual Preferences in the Theory of Voting Procedures. In: Kacprzyk, J., Roubens, M. (eds) Non-Conventional Preference Relations in Decision Making. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 301. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51711-2_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51711-2_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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