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Game Theoretical Approach to Optimal Control of Economic Systems

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Book cover Econometric Decision Models

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 366))

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Abstract

Some features introduced into economic models (rational expectations) and new hypotheses on the behavior of the policymakers (risk aversion, strategic planning) have forced economists to derive generalized control methods. Game theory seems to be a natural framework in such a case. As opposed to a standard optimal control solution different outcomes occur depending on the information available to players and on the mode of the play. Two types of information structures are distinguished and discussed in the context of a policy model with a discrete time econometric model as a part of it.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics, University of Gdańsk, Armii Czerwonej 101, Pl-81-824, Sopot, Poland

    Krystyna Strzała

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  1. Krystyna Strzała
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hagen, Feithstr. 140, W-5800, Hagen 1, Germany

    Josef Gruber Ph.D. (Chair of Statistics and Econometrics) (Chair of Statistics and Econometrics)

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Strzała, K. (1991). Game Theoretical Approach to Optimal Control of Economic Systems. In: Gruber, J. (eds) Econometric Decision Models. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 366. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51675-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51675-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-54373-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-51675-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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