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Value Allocations: An Exposition

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 244)

Abstract

Among the most interesting of economic problems is the question of how commodities and wealth become allocated among individuals. At its simplest, an economy may be thought of as a collection of agents who meet and trade commodities with each other. In the absence of coersion, trade will occur only if agents are able to mutually agree upon the terms of trade. A fundamental part of economic theory is the study of the bargaining process that underlies this search for agreement.

Keywords

Utility Function Solution Concept Exchange Economy Competitive Equilibrium Utility Level 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWayne State UniversityDetroitUSA

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