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Value and Fairness

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 244)

Abstract

Value allocation is a cooperative solution concept designed to predict which Pareto optimal outcomes will be selected by an explicit bargaining process among the agents in an economy. The concept of value allocation may be either in the context of cardinal utility due to Shapley (1969) or in an ordinal formulation due to Aumann (1975). The controversial features of value allocations have been recently examined by a number of authors, notably, Shafer (1980), Roth (1980, 1983), Harsanyi (1980), Yannelis (1983), Thomson (1983), Aumann (1983) and Scafuri-Yannelis (1984). This research has also pointed out several peculiarities of value allocations.

Keywords

Measure Space Solution Concept Exchange Economy Competitive Equilibrium Price Vector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA

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