Abstract
In the previous section we explored some solutions which, like the (symmetric and non-symmetric) Nash solutions, are independent of irrelevant alternatives but which, unlike the Nash solutions, are not independent of equivalent utility representations. In this section we will consider some solutions which are independent of equivalent utility representations, but which are not independent of “irrelevant” alternatives. That is, we will consider some solutions which are sensitive to changes in the set of feasible outcomes in a way which the Nash solutions are not.
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Roth, A.E. (1979). “Irrelevant” Alternatives. In: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 170. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-09540-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-51570-5
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