Abstract
In this chapter the strategic interactions between two countries forming an exchange rate union and the rest of the world are analysed. Each country pursues its targets using policy instruments, the change of which also affects the other countries’ targets. The system of interdependence is derived from the model studied in chapter IV, the introductory section of which is to be referred to for references to the literature on the policy coordination debate. The medium-run results of the model will be used, as the most idenous for the purpose of analysing policy interactions.
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Bibliography
Alogoskoufis, G.; Portes, R. (1991): “The International Costs and Benefits of EMU”, in: NBER Working Papers, Nr. 3884, June.
Canzoneri, M.; Henderson, D. (1991): Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game Theoretical Approach, Cambridge (Mass.).
Goodhart, C. (1992): “The External Dimension of EMU”, in: LSE Financial Markets Group Special Papers, Nr. 42.
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© 1994 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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De Bonis, V. (1994). Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a “Big” Exchange Rate Union a Strategic Analysis. In: Stabilization Policy in an Exchange Rate Union. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51526-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51526-2_6
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0789-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-51526-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive