Abstract
The European Monetary System (EMS) can be characterised as a cooperative but non-symmetric agreement between Germany and the small economies of the Deutsche mark area on the one side and countries affected by divergent macroeconomic performances like France and Italy on the other side.
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References
Farina, F., (1992): “Monetary Policy”, in F. Francioni (ed.) (1992) “Italy and EC Membership Evaluated”, Pinter Publishers, London
Hochreiter, E., Winckler, G., (1991): “Signaling a Hard Currency Strategy: The Case of Austria”, forthcoming in Kredit and Kapital
Kydland, F. E., Prescott, E. C. (1977): “Rules Rather Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, pp. 473–910.
Rogoff, K. (1985): “Can International Monetary Cooperation Be Counterproductive?”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 199–217.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Farina, F. (1994). Reflections on the Papers by De Cecco and Hochreiter. In: Böhm, B., Punzo, L.F. (eds) Economic Performance. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51170-7_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51170-7_10
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0811-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-51170-7
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