Abstract
The tension between “optimality” and “dynamic consistency” of economic planning has, since Kydland and Prescott’s [1977] work, stimulated a large number of papers.
This chapter was completed in December 1988.
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Amann, E., Ritzberger, K. (1995). Reputational Equilibrium in a Macro-Economic Game with Infinite Action Spaces and a Continuum of Types. In: Riedl, A., Winckler, G., Wörgötter, A. (eds) Macroeconomic Policy Games. Studies in Empirical Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50307-8_1
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