Abstract
The following noncooperative game is a more general version of the usual model of a noncooperative game developped by J. Nash in 1950. The model considered here generalizes the model of Nash in two respects: First, players choose their acts dependent on private informations, and second, there are constraint correspondences which players have to observe when choosing their acts. The strategies of the players are decision functions, which attach an act to each information. The information a player obtains will thereby in general not be equal to the whole information available, and there will be no chance for a direct inference on the information of the other players. For that reason games of this type are called games with incomplete information.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1987 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Meister, H. (1987). The Purification Problem in the Game-Theoretic Context. In: The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 295. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50278-1_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50278-1_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-18429-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-50278-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive