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The demand for and the supply of volunteers

  • Chapter
Military Conscription

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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Abstract

In chapter four and five we used the “opportunity cost” instrument to investigate military conscription. With the opportunity cost instrument we analysed the social costs of conscription in terms of the conscription tax and we used these social costs for the social cost price of conscripts to analyse the allocation questions in the armed forces.

“Enlargement of the interested supply and a better way of reaching the supply can mean that the need for volunteers can be narrowly accomplished, but for the conversion of a conscription army into an all-volunteer force it is necessary that the armed forces shed a light on its needs and procedures.

Research voor Beleid in “Naar dienstplicht nieuwe stijl”-rapport Commissie Meijer, Den Haag 1992.

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References

  1. This paragraph is among others articles based on: G.S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: a theoretical analysis, “Journal of political economy, vol. 70, 1962; G.J. Stigler, “Information in the labor market”, The journal of political economy, vol. 70, 1962 and NorBerFN, Nordic Standby forces in United Nations service, Stockholm, 1974.

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  2. Edmund S. Phelps (et al.), Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, New York, 1970, pp. 1–27.

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  3. Maatschappelijke Raad voor de Krijgsmacht, Contractduur, advies 24, Den Haag, 1992, pp.2.

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  4. Variability in length of contract opens the possibility for matching. This is analyzed in paragraph 6.2.

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  5. In paragraph 6.4. further analysis will be made to assure that contracts are really served untill the end or that contracts are extended.

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  6. Steven L. Canby, Military Manpower Procurement, a Policy Analysis, Lexington 1977, pp. 65.

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  7. This shows again the possibilities for civilians in the armed forces.

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  8. The risk of life does not only influence the willingness of potential volunteers to supply themselves to the armed forces. The relation is true the other way around too. The structure of the armed forces influences the risks that volunteers can meet. In paragraph 6.4.2. it will be explained that the risks in an all-volunteer force will be different than the risks in a conscription army.

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  9. With regard to this point also matching opportunities are possible, see paragraph 6.2.

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  10. See chapter 5, paragraph 2.

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  11. Bruce Jr.Bliven, Volunteers, one and all, New York, 1962, pp.133.

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  12. In 1996 it was even 9 months

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  13. MRK-advies nr. 25: Internationalisering van de krijgsmacht, Den Haag 1992, pp. 61.

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  14. For reasons of self-defence violence can also be tolerated here.

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  15. Therefore the left side of figure 6.1. can probably be extended.

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  16. Supplemented with the marine corps

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  17. Source:Nordic Stand-by-Forces in United Nations service, NorBerFN, Stockholm, 1974, pp. 45.

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  18. in practice this means that the apprentice-system will be introduced in the army.

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  19. An example of such an event is the Gulf-war.

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  20. In paragraph 6.4. of this chapter we will take a further look at the joining of the salary to the length of the contract, the amount of risk, scarcity, etc.

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  21. In practice this means that the salary structure should be detached from the ranking system. As an example we can think about the salary of an infantry-soldier with a six-year contract. This salary can be higher than the salary of a lieutenant at the intendance, if it becomes clear that these lieutenants are much easier to get on the labour market, while soldiers for the infantry are much more difficult to get. See further paragraph 6.4.

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  22. The ABOHZIS-formula is a classification-system for the physical feasibility of the volunteer. Every letter represents a certain characteristic of the human body and gets value 1 till 5. A stands for Algemeen (general), B is upper limbs and longs, O is down limbs, H is hearing, Z is view, I is intelligence and S is stability.

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  23. This will say, the more strict the selection criteria are applied (less faults are allowed in the armed forces) the more suitable volunteers will be rejected. If the restriction of all else being equal is released, for example because there are better predictors, the figures for zl and z2 are both going down. The development of better predictors is not with development and administration costs.

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  24. David S.C. Chu and Eva Norrblom, Psysical Standards in an All-Volunteer Force, The Rand Corporation, April 1974.

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  25. Rapport Commissie Dienstplicht, biz. 24. The one to eight figure only applies to the Royal Army. Other parts of the armed forces have higher figures.

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  26. This paragraph is based on the work of Thomas G. Sticht, Military Testing and Public Policy: selected Studies of Lower Aptitude Personnel, in: Bernard R.Gifford and Linda C. Wing, Test Policy in Defense, Boston 1992.

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  27. Sticht, pp. 15. The “Army alpha” was the old test.

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  28. Evans, The Army and the Underclass: losing Battle, in Sticht, pp. 21.

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  30. Sticht, pp.21.

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  31. Ibid.

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  32. Sticht, pp. 62.

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  33. Sticht, pp. 64.

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  34. Sticht, pp. 44.

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  35. Maatschappelijke Raad voor de Krijgsmacht, advise nr 7: “De vrouw in de krijgsmacht”, Den Haag 1984.

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  36. See MRK-advise nr 7, pp 18 and 19.

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  37. An exception is the F-16 fighter. Practice shows that even the best trained women can not resist the pressures that become apparent during fighting missions. It is almost superfluous to mention that most men do not meet the standards either the resist these powers

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  38. See MRK-advise nr. 7, pp. 52.

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  39. See MRK-advise nr. 7, pp. 33

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  40. Binkin and Bach, pp. 89 and further 4i MRK-advise nr. 7, pp. 35

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  41. Binkin and Bach, pp 93–95.

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  42. See for example Charles C.iMoskos, jr., The American Enlisted Man, pp. 143–146.

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  43. Ibid., pp. 145

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  44. Binkin and Bach, pp. 92.

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  45. MRK-advise nr 7, pp. 66

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  46. Ibid, pp. 101

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  47. Meijer-committee, Naar dienstplicht nieuwe stijl, Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag, 1992, pp.49

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  48. See also chapter 2, paragraph 1.

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  49. The last years a change can be seen in the armed forces concerning the use of skills in stead of service time for promotion possibilities.

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  50. Defense Manpower Committee, Defense Manpower: the Keystone of National Security, April 1976, in: M. Binkin and I. Kyriakopoulos, Youth or Experience? Manning the Modern Military, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., pp.31

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  51. This paragraph is based on Richard E. Wagner, Conscription, Voluntary Service and Democratic Fiscal Choice, in: Buchanan and Tollison, Theory of Public Choice, 1972, pp. 136–152.

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  52. See e.g.: Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Paying the Modern Military, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1981.

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  53. See for a further explanation about the institution armed forces: Charles C. Moskos Jr., “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 4 (fall 1977), pp. 42.

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  54. United Kingdom, National board for prices and incomes, Standing reference on the pay of the armed forces: second report, Report 116, p. 6 in: Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, Paying the modern military, p. 21.

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  55. Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, pp. 21–22.

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  56. Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, pp. 44.

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  57. N. van Dijkhuizen en P.H.J. Suiker, Is rang alleen rang als er rang op Staat?, Leusden, 1991.

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  58. Van Dijkhuizen and Suiker, on cit. p. 60. See for the same kind of words: Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, Paying the Modern Military, chapter 4.

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  59. Letter. 90/377/23459 to the Chairman of the Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, ‘s-Gravenhage, 14november 1991.

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  1. Open University of the Netherlands, Valkenburgerweg 177, NL-6419 AT, Heerlen, The Netherlands

    Dr. Simon Duindam

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Duindam, S. (1999). The demand for and the supply of volunteers. In: Military Conscription. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50005-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50005-3_6

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1203-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-50005-3

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