Abstract
Why do players break off bargaining games with a positive surplus? The analysis in this chapter examines this question by studying the special circumstances under which break off occurred and examines whether under the same conditions also agreements were possible.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kuon, B. (1994). Break Offs. In: Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 412. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-57920-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48777-4
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