Abstract
Consider a world of individuals being involved in the two-person bargaining game with incomplete information. The world consists of four different populations: the weak first movers, the strong first movers, the weak second movers, and the strong second movers. A member of a first mover population interacts with the members of both second mover populations and vice versa. The four populations act according to the strategies of the strategy experiment. Suppose, in the beginning of the world every strategy has the same number of representatives in each of the four populations. The number of representatives of a strategy in a population in the following period depends on its fitness. One could pose the question how the four populations develop under this dynamic and whether the evolutionary selection by fitness converges to an equilibrium of the one-shot game.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kuon, B. (1994). An Evolutionary Tournament. In: Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 412. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-57920-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48777-4
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