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Bargaining Sets in Continuum Economies

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Nonlinear and Convex Analysis in Economic Theory

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 419))

Abstract

Aumann and Maschler [3] originally introduced the concept of the bargaining set. The bargaining set differs from the core in that it takes account of the reaction of others when a coalition engages on an improving move as an objection to a proposed allocation. Mas-Colell [9] proposed a redefinition of the original concept so that it does not depend upon distinguished individual agents and becomes well defined in continuum economies.

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References

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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Yamazaki, A. (1995). Bargaining Sets in Continuum Economies. In: Maruyama, T., Takahashi, W. (eds) Nonlinear and Convex Analysis in Economic Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 419. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48719-4_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48719-4_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58767-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48719-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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