Abstract
The structure of optimal information systems and incentive schemes has been studied at some length in the preceding chapters. So far the stress has been exclusively on information that is public and verifiable, i.e. which can be documented conclusively to a third party like a court. In most contexts, however, there exist large amounts of private, non-verifiable information. In this chapter, we investigate the use and value of such information. We emphasize that we shall be concerned with private information acquired after contracting.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bogetoft, P. (1994). Non-Verifiable Information. In: Non-Cooperative Planning Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 418. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58361-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48636-4
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