Abstract
In this chapter, we suggest that it may contribute to the theoretical foundations of specific Operations Research (OR) techniques to consider their viability and performance in a context with explicit non-cooperative elements. We illustrate the idea by analyzing a class of productivity analysis methods that have recently gained momentum in the literature, namely the socalled Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods. We examine to which extent such methods may support incentives in delegated decision making.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bogetoft, P. (1994). Incentives and Productivity Measures. In: Non-Cooperative Planning Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 418. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58361-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48636-4
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