Abstract
Outcome preferences, anticipations, and choice intentions or choices were investigated in a group of eight Prisoner’s Dilemma Game matrices with different degrees of conflict severity. The variables were recorded with a computer assisted questionnaire and during the initial period of a sequence of games. Results from 106 subjects showed that their social ’motives’ remained essentially stable across the different games. Expectancies and choices were strongly dependent on social ’motives’. The majority of choices could be explained with the social ’motives’ and the expectancies in line with the expectancy-conditional maximization of preference.
This research project was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Schu 543/1-1). This article was translated from the German by Jonathan Harrow, Bielefeld.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ajzen, I./ Pishbein, M. (1970): The prediction of behavior from attitudinal and normative variables. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 466–487.
Dawes, R. M./ McTavich, J.; Shaklee, H. (1977): Behavior communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a common dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1–11.
Hesse, W./ Schulz, U. (1986): Preference structures by payoffs in experimental games. In: Scholz, R.W. (ed.) (1986): Current Issues in West-German Decision Research. Lang, Frankfurt.
Kelley, H.H./ Stahelski, J.A. (1970): Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ belief about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.
Krivohlavy, J. (1974): Zwischenmenschliche Konflikte und Spiele. Huber: Bern.
Kuhlman, D. M./ Marshello, A. (1975): Individual differences in the game motives of own, relative, and joint gain. Journal of Research in Personality, 9, 240–251.
Liebrand, W.B.G. (1982): Interpersonal differences in social dilemmas; a game theoretical approach. Dissertation, Groningen.
Liebrand, W.B.G. (1984): The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behaviour in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239–264.
Maki, J.E./ McClintock, C. (1983): The accuracy of soicial value prediction: actor and observer influences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 829–838.
Messe, L.A./ Sivacek, B.M. (1979): Predictions of other’s responses in a mixed-motive game: Self-justification or false consensus? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 602–607.
Messick, D.M./ McClintock, C.G. (1968): Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1–25.
Miller, D.T./ Holmes, J.G. (1975): The role of situational restrictiveness on self-fulfilling prophecies: A theoretical and empirical extension of Kelley & Stahelski’s Triangle Hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 661–673.
Rapoport, A./ Chammah, A.M. (1965): Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Rapoport, A./ Guyer, J.G./ Gordon, D.G. (1976): The 2x2 Game. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Ross, L. (1977): The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances and experimental social psychology (Vol. 10). New York: Academic Press.
Schlenker, B.R./ Goldman, H.J. (1978): Cooperators and competitors in conflict: a test of the “triangle model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 393–410.
Schulz, U. (1979): Ein mathematisches Modell für das Verhalten in Sequenzen von Prisoner’s-Dilemma-Spielen unter Berücksichtigung von Erwartungen. In: Albers, W. et al., Entscheidung in kleinen Gruppen. Königstein: Hain.
Schulz, U. (1986): The structure of conflict and preferences in experimental games. In: Scholz, R.W. (ed.) (1986): Current Issues in West-German Decision Research. Lang, Frankfurt.
Schulz, U./ Hesse, W. (1978): Ein Modell für das Spielverhalten in Prisoner’s-Di-lemma-Sequenzen unter Berücksichtigung der Erwartungen. Psychologische Beiträge, 20, 551–570.
Stoecker, R. (1980): Experimentelle Untersuchung des Entscheidungsverhaltens im Bertrand-Oligopol. Bielefeld: Pfeffer.
Wendt, D./ Popp, M./ Wettengel, A./ Ksiensik, M.I. (1985): Egotism and altruism in social dilemmata. Institute of Psychology, Christian-Albrecht University, Kiel.
Wyer, R. S. (1969): Prediction of behavior in two-person games. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 222–238.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Schulz, U. (1988). The Influence of Social Orientation and Generalized Expectancies on Decision Making in Iterated Experimental Games. In: Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R. (eds) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50036-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48356-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive