Abstract
In a series of experiments, a three-person matrix game has been played under conditions allowing cooperation by bargaining and coalition formation. Agreements are not binding, leading to situations with both cooperative and non-cooperative aspects.
Modelizing cooperative solution concepts despite the known variants of the core (alpha, beta) the concepts of gamma-core and minimal-core are introduced. In the bargaining process players can decide to take the role of an actor or to take the reacting part just to foundate a line of argumentation. For example a coalition can announce own decicions in order to elicit their non-members (opposition) best replies. Pairs of an acting coalition and a reacting opposition generate game trees. Models of the above type are used to induce different types of cooperative conflict in the experimental situation. A further fundamental variable is given by the relation between equilibria and the minimal-core.
Despite the fact that there is a high percentage of cooperatively optimal agreements only few plays are stable (without deviation from the agreement). Nevertheless equilibria are not attractive.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ostmann, A. (1988). Limits of Rational Behaviour in Cooperatively Played Normal Form Games. In: Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R. (eds) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_22
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