Abstract
Subjects in this experiment, unlike those in typical coalition experiments, were required to “invest” varying number of points in a three-person quota game. Models based on justice norms (e.g., Adams’ equity theory) and models based on transforming the game (subtracting investments from coalition values) were contrasted. The results indicate that the justice norms are generally more accurate, but their accuracy varies inversely with the variance of the investments, and directly with the degree of correspondence between investments and quota values. The results also suggest that no single theory is likely to be accurate in a variety of situations. Hence, the basic problem for future research is to determine the boundary conditions of various theories.
This study was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS 83-09192) to the first author.
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Komorita, S.S., Ellis, A.L., Melton, R.J. (1988). The Effects of Justice Norms in a Bargaining Situation. In: Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R. (eds) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_18
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