Abstract
In a sequential bargaining experiment the players had to choose strategies for a round of two-person games with different players. After each round the players had the possibility to revise their strategies for a new round. The final strategies formed a special kind of equilibrium which can be interpreted as bounded rational equilibrium. An attempt is made to identify bounded rational behavior with subsets of the set of all strategies. A parametric strategy which models some elements of bounded rational behavior is adapted in a process of learning from repeated games. The learning process is modeled by simulating a simple evolution process with successive steps of mutation and selection.
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Becker, O., Huschens, S. (1988). Bounded Rational Strategies in Sequential Bargaining: An Experiment and a Learning by Evolution Strategy. In: Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R. (eds) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_10
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