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Cournot-Bertrand mixed oligopolies

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 133))

Abstract

Two kinds of oligopoly models are considered in the literature, one of them is usually attributed to the very founder of the theory A. Cournot [l838], the other one to J. Bertrand [l883] (see, e.g Priedmann [l972]. Both kinds are intended to describe a market with imperfect competition. An oligopoly of either kind can be presented under the form of a non-cooperative game, thus the non-cooperative equilibrium may be considered as its solution. This was indeed proposed by Cournot himself who has defined for an oligopoly that, what was later extended by J. Nash [1950] to the more general case of a many-person game and therefore is called sometimes the Nash equilibrium.

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References

  • J. Bertrand, 1883, Theorie mathematigue de la richesse sociale, Journal des Savants, Paris, 499–508.

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  • A. Cournot, 1838, Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la tlieorie des richesses, chap. 7.

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  • J.W. Friedmann, 1972, On the structure of oligopoly models with differentiated products, in: Beiträge zur Experimentallen Wirtschaftsforschung, ed. H. Sauermann, vol. 11, Tübingen, I.G.B. Mohr.

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  • J.F. Nash, 1950, Equilibrium points in n person game, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36, 48–49.

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  • J.M. Henderson and R.E. Quandt, 1971, Microeconomic Theory, A Mathematical Approach, McGrow-Hill, Kogakusha.

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© 1976 Springer-Verlag Berlin. Heidelberg New York

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Bylka, S., Komar, J. (1976). Cournot-Bertrand mixed oligopolies. In: Łoś, M., Łoś, J., Wieczorek, A. (eds) Warsaw Fall Seminars in Mathematical Economics 1975. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 133. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48296-0_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48296-0_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-07871-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48296-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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