Abstract
It is tempting to believe that public transportation systems can be completely planned. Ready techniques such as Nonlinear Programming could be applied to predict and control movements of people between given origins and destinations in a prescribed manner. But a closer view of affairs shows that even in the most perfectly planned system the public retains certain freedoms, and that it may choose to ignore the intentions of planners and play games of its own. Transportation analysis cannot afford to loose sight of “how people use transportation”. [1]
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References
Charles Townes, Public Policy Committee General Motors as quoted in Fortune, January, 1972, page 176.
G.B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 19 63, 568–91.
M. Beckmann, C.B. McGuire and C.B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956,
M.J. Beckmann, and T. Golob, “Traveler Decisions and Traffic Flows: A Behavioral Theory of Network Equilibrium,” 6th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, Sydney, Australia, 1974.
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© 1976 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Beckmann, M.J. (1976). Equilibrium Versus Optimum in Public Transportation Systems. In: Florian, M.A. (eds) Traffic Equilibrium Methods. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 118. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48123-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48123-9_5
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