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Slot Allocation in the United States A Transaction Cost Economics Analysis

  • Conference paper
Firms, Markets, and Contracts

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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Abstract

This paper analyses allocation of slots in the airline industry with the tools of Transaction Cost Economics. The requirements of the transacting industries are analysed and compared to the mechanisms currently used in the United States. Objective is to understand the contracting arrangements between airline and airport industry in the United States.

This paper has been presented in a slightly modified version at the World Conference in Transportation Research in Sydney, Australia, in July 1995.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kollegium am Schloß, Bau IV, Universität Karlsruhe, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Sabine J. Langner

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  1. Sabine J. Langner
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Organisation, Universität München, Ludwigstraße 28, D-80539, München, Germany

    Arnold Picot

  2. Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität München, Schackstraße 4, D-80539, München, Germany

    Ekkehart Schlicht

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© 1997 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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Langner, S.J. (1997). Slot Allocation in the United States A Transaction Cost Economics Analysis. In: Picot, A., Schlicht, E. (eds) Firms, Markets, and Contracts. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_17

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0947-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46988-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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