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Information Problems in the Market for Medical Services

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Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

Abstract

In Germany outpatient medical treatment is predominantly carried out by self-employed physicians. The service offered by physicians is a complex good whose quality cannot be controlled by patients prior to purchase. The underlying problem of asymmetric information resp. protecting patients from incompetent and careless physicians has been the rationale of a host of regulatory interventions in this market. These interventions include barriers to entry into the market and severe restrictions regarding the conduct of physicians.

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© 1997 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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Richard, S. (1997). Information Problems in the Market for Medical Services. In: Picot, A., Schlicht, E. (eds) Firms, Markets, and Contracts. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_12

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0947-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46988-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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