Abstract
In recent years the problem of terrorism has been addressed within a game-theoretic framework. In particular Lapan and Sandler [1988] and Lee [1988] analyze optimal governmental antiterrorist policies confronting politically motivated terroristic acts like e.g. skyjacking. A distinguishing feature of those analyses is that the perception of success of a terroristic attack (e.g., anticipated concessions of the government) is not assumed to be the only reason why those attacks occur in the first place. According to this literature benefits derived from publicity or martyrdom going along with terroristic action could explain terrorist activity, no matter what reactions government might take. In particular a precommitment not to concede is not ueccessarily a cure-all policy to prevent terrorism.
We would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
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References
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. [1991], Came Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Lapan, H. and Sandler, T. [1988], “To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question”. American Economic Review, PAP, May, 16–21.
Lee, D. [1988], “Tree Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight Against Terrorism”, American Economic Review, PAP, May. 22–26.
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© 1997 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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Mohr, B., Schmidt-Mohr, U. (1997). On the Rationality of Kidnaps, Blackguards, and Hostages. In: Picot, A., Schlicht, E. (eds) Firms, Markets, and Contracts. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_11
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