Abstract
The concept of the renegotiation-proof solution of a dynamic game is discussed in the context of a duopoly controlling two overlapping markets. The solution represents a collusive equilibrium which is robust to policy changes by individual players as well as to policy changes made by the two players acting as a team.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Tolwinski, B. (1988). A Renegotiation-Proof Solution for a Price Setting Duopoly. In: Eiselt, H.A., Pederzoli, G. (eds) Advances in Optimization and Control. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 302. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46629-8_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46629-8_25
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-18962-6
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