Abstract
Nash (1950, 1953) isolated a particular cooperative solution for bargaining, first by axiomatization, and then by identifying it with an equilibrium of a noncooperative game. Regarding the latter game as artificial, Rubinstein (1982) obtained a unique perfect equilibrium in a more realistic, multi-stage, noncooperative model. His solution is Pareto efficient. To remove several possible objections, Binmore (1982, 1985) derived the limit form for the Rubinstein solution, letting the length of each stage approach zero.
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Clemhout, S., Wan, H.Y. (1988). A General Dynamic Model of Bargaining — The Perfect Information Case. In: Eiselt, H.A., Pederzoli, G. (eds) Advances in Optimization and Control. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 302. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46629-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46629-8_21
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