Abstract
Multicriteria games, which do not necessarily assume a priori aggregation of the criteria or attribute of each player by a utility function, have not been investigated in depth yet. However, this type of repetitive decision situation is of a major interest when preparing a decision support system for realistic problems with many actors involved. An additional dimension of difficulty emerges if some hierarchical aspects are included in the consideration. Hierarchical decision structures have been investigated either in the single criteria fully centralized case, (e.g., Findeisen et al., 1980), or in the fully centralized games of Stackelberg-Germeer type, (Germeer, 1976). Until now, no other reasonable formalization of a decentralized game with hierarchical aspects, allowing for interactive specification of changing multicriteria interests and learning by all actors has been proposed. The purpose of this paper is to explore possibilities of such a formalization, based on a relatively simple but realistic example of regional investment allocation.
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Kobayashi, K., Tanino, T., Wierzbicki, A.P., Okumura, M. (1987). Multiactor Decision Analysis for Regional Investment Allocation. In: Sawaragi, Y., Inoue, K., Nakayama, H. (eds) Toward Interactive and Intelligent Decision Support Systems. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46609-0_45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46609-0_45
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