Investigating the Use of the Core as a Solution Concept in Spatial Price Equilibrium Games

  • Patrick T. Harker
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 249)


This paper presents a critical appraisal of the use of the core as a solution concept for games involving spatially separated producers. Starting from the classicl Samuelson/Takayama-Judge spatial price equilibrium model, the core of a game between the producers of commodities in this economy is defined, the conditions ensuring the nonemptiness of the core are stated, and the problems surrounding the definition and computation of the characteristic function are addressed.


Nash Equilibrium Characteristic Function Cooperative Game Solution Concept Variational Inequality Problem 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick T. Harker
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Decision SciencesThe Wharton School University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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