Abstract
This paper presents a critical appraisal of the use of the core as a solution concept for games involving spatially separated producers. Starting from the classicl Samuelson/Takayama-Judge spatial price equilibrium model, the core of a game between the producers of commodities in this economy is defined, the conditions ensuring the nonemptiness of the core are stated, and the problems surrounding the definition and computation of the characteristic function are addressed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ahn, B-H. and William W. Hogan (1982). On the convergence of the PIES algorithm for computing equilibria, Operations Research 30, 281–300.
Bard, Jonathan F. and James E. Falk (1978). Computing Equilibria Via Nonconvex Programming, Serial T-386, Institute for Management Science and Engineering, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Bard, Jonathan F. and James E. Falk (1982). An explicit solution to the multi-level programming problem, Computers and Operations Research 9(1), 77–100.
Falk, James E. and Garth P. McCormick (1982). Mathematical Structure of the International Coal Trade Model, Energy Information Adiminstration, U.S. DEpartment of Energy, September 1983.
Fiacco, Anthony V. (1983). Introduction to Sensitivity and Stability Analysis in Nonlinear Programming, New York, New York: Academic Press.
Friedman, James W. (1979). Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Friesz, Terry L., Roger L. Tobin, Tony E. Smith and Patrick T. Harker (1983). A nonlinear complementarity formulation and solution procedure for the general derived demand network equilibrium problem, Journal of Regional Science 23, 337–359.
Harker, Patrick T. (1985). Alternative models of spatial competition, in progress, Operations Research.
Harker, P.T. (1984a). A generalized spatial price equilibrium model, Papers of the Regional Science Association, forthcoming.
Harker, Patrick T. (1984b). A variational inequality approach for the determination of oligopolistic market equilibrium, Mathematical Programming 30, 105–111.
Haurie, A. and Patrice Marcotte (1984). On the relationship between Nash-Cournot and Wardrop equilibria, Networks, forthcoming.
Hildenbrand, W. and A.P. Kirman (1976). Introduction to Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hobbs, Benjamin F. (1984a). A spatial linear programming analysis of the deregulation of electricity generation, Operations Research, forthcoming.
Hobbs, Benjamin F. (1984b). Modeling imperfect spatial energy markets, in B.D Solomon (ed.), Geographical Dimensions of Energy, forthcoming.
Hogan, William W. (1975). Energy policy models for project independence, Computers and Operations Research 2, 251–271.
Hogan, William W., J.L. Sweeney and M.D. Wagner (1978). Energy policy models for the National Energy Outlook, TIMS Studies in Management Science 10, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Kennedy, M. (1974). An economic model of the world oil markets, Bell Journal of Economics 5, 540–577.
McCormick, Garth P. (1983). Nonlinear Programming: Theory, Algorithms and Applications, New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Moulin, Herve (1982). Game Theory for the Social Sciences, New York, New York: New York University Press.
Ponsard, Claude (1982). Partial spatial equilibria with fuzzy constraints, Journal of Regional Science 22, 159–176.
Rosenthal, Robert W. (1971). External economies and cores, Journal of Economic Theory 3, 182–188.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1952). Spatial price equilibrium and linear programming, American Economic Review 42, 283–303.
Scarf, Herbert (1971). On the existence of a cooperative solution for a general class of n-person games, Journal of Economic Theory 3, 169–181.
Scarf, Herbert (1973). The Computation of Economic Equilibrium, Cowles Foundation Monograph 24, New Haven, Conn.: Yale university Press.
Sheppard, E. and L. Curry (1982). Spatial price equilibria, Geographical Analysis 14, 279–304.
Shubik, Martin (1982). Game Theory in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Takayama, T. and George G. Judge (1964). Equilibrium among spatially separated markets: a reformulation, Econometrica 32 510–524.
Takayama, T. and George G. Judge (1971), Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation Models, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Zimmerman, Martin B. (1981). The U.S. Coal Industry: The Economics of Policy Choice, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1985 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Harker, P.T. (1985). Investigating the Use of the Core as a Solution Concept in Spatial Price Equilibrium Games. In: Harker, P.T. (eds) Spatial Price Equilibrium: Advances in Theory, Computation and Application. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 249. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46548-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46548-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-15681-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46548-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive