Abstract
Wage bargaining may formally be treated as decision problems among two parties with different utility functions. The decision consists of determining the increase of the wage rate for the time of the tariff-contract commonly accepted by the both tariff-parties representing the employers and the employees respectively. So far on principle the same solution methods of the game and the bargaining theory can be applied to such decision situations as they come into question for multi-person-decision problems in organizations (FANDEL 1979a; FANDEL 1979b). However because of the special problem structure in the case of wage bargaining one may restrict mainly to cooperative solution concepts without side payments.
In the following especially it will be analysed, how far the methodical approaches of NASH (1953), ZEUTHEN (1930) and CONTINI and ZIONTS (1968) can be used in practice in order to explain and reconstruct the courses of and the agreements within wage bargaining processes. Thereby the investigations refer to wage bargaining in the metal industry of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1961 and 1979.
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References
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© 1985 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Fandel, G. (1985). On the Applicability of Group Decision Making Concepts to Wage Bargaining. In: Haimes, Y.Y., Chankong, V. (eds) Decision Making with Multiple Objectives. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 242. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46536-9_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46536-9_39
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