Abstract
In this paper, game theoretic solution concepts are applied to a dynamic linear-quadratic econometric decision model with more than one decision maker. Noncooperative Nash- and Stackelberg-, and cooperative Nash-Harsanyi-solutions are given. The cooperative Nash-Harsanyi solution concept allows the determination of a social preference function which reflects the individual objectives of the single decision makers with a fair weight. The theoretical discussion will be closed by a numerical illustration.
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© 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Haas, H. (1983). Conflict, Cooperation and Social Preference Functions. In: Gruber, J. (eds) Econometric Decision Models. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 208. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46464-5_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46464-5_11
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