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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 196))

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Abstract

This chapter introduces some concepts and results from the Theory of Games, in particular the concept of noncooperative NASH equilibrium. In a sense, the study of markets with imperfect information leads naturally to game theoretic considerations: “imperfect information” typically introduces some factors which violate the assumptions of perfect competition, thus making room for (if not necessitating) strategic behavior on part of at least some economic agents. An agent acts strategically if (a) he recognizes that his own welfare depends not only on his own actions, but also on the actions of other agents; and (b) when choosing an action he takes into account the possible reactions of others, knowing they also take account of his possible reactions, etc.

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© 1982 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Nermuth, M. (1982). Some Game Theory. In: Information Structures in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46447-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46447-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-11186-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46447-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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