Abstract
We have described in Chapter I a problem in which one side buys a mixture of weapons systems, his opponent discovers what he has done and buys a countering mixture, and finally the original side allocates his residuum to the opponent’s target complex. There are three stages: Max-Min-Max, in which the original side has the two outside Max moves and his opponent the middle Min move.
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© 1967 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Danskin, J.M. (1967). On stability and Max-Min-Max. In: The Theory of Max-Min and its Application to Weapons Allocation Problems. Ökonometrie und Unternehmensforschung / Econometrics and Operations Research, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46092-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46092-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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