Abstract
It is a stylized fact of many experiments on the ultimatum game and alternating offer bargaining games that play deviates from the game theoretic solution toward equitable allocations. Evidence for this result are the surveys by Güth and Tietz (1990) and Thaler (1988) as well as the more recent ones by Roth (1995) and Camerer and Thaler (1995).
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Königstein, M. (2000). Profit Sharing in an Asymmetric Bargaining Game. In: Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 483. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45782-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45782-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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