Abstract
In our experiment a two-person characteristic function game was played. Each of the ‘players’ comprises a group of three, in some cases two, persons. The groups receive a guaranteed payoff, if they do not form a coalition, but break off the negotiation. These values, being v(1),v(2), where v(1) > v(2), are also called alternative, outside option, threat point or status quo. The coalition value, v(12), can be distributed between the two groups, where v(12) > v(1) + v(2) and v(1) + v(2) = v(12)/2.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Hennig-Schmidt, H. (1999). Description of the Experiment. In: Bargaining in a Video Experiment. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 467. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45775-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45775-3_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65415-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45775-3
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