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Monotonicity of Power Indices

  • František Turnovec
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 465)

Abstract

The paper investigates general properties of power indices, measuring the voting power in committees. Concepts of local and global monotonicity of power indices are introduced. Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Coleman, and Holler-Packel indices are analyzed and it is proved that while Shapley-Shubik index satisfies both local and global monotonicity property, Banzhaf-Coleman satisfies only local monotonicity without being globally monotonic and Holler-Packel index satisfies neither local nor global monotonicity.

Keywords

Anonymity committee dummy member marginality monotonicity power index power axioms quota voting weights winning configuration 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • František Turnovec
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Economic Research and Graduate EducationCharles University, & Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPrague 1Czech Republic

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