Abstract
We study in this paper dynamic equilibrium advertising strategies in a duopoly with asymmetric information structure. The advertising model of Lanchester is used in a game where the relevant solution concept is feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. An algorithm is devised for the computation of this equilibrium and numerical results are reported and discussed for different values of the various parameters.
Research supported by CETAI, HEC and NSERC-Canada.
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Breton, M., Yezza, A., Zaccour, G. (1996). Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria in a Dynamic Game of Advertising Competition: A Numerical Analysis. In: Jørgensen, S., Zaccour, G. (eds) Dynamic Competitive Analysis in Marketing. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 444. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45753-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45753-1_1
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