Abstract
The last chapter dealt with cooperation in a first-best world. Pareto optimality could be obtained by jointly maximising the objectives of all the nations involved.
“Ora, per ci che io l’amo, non intendo di voler altra vendetta di lui pigliare, se non quale stata l’offesa: egli ha la mia donna avuta, e io intendo d’aver te. Dove tu non vogli, per certo egli converr che io il ci colga; e per ci che io non intendo di lasciare questa ingiuria impunita, io gli far giuoco che n tu n egli sarete mai lieti.”
G. Boccaccio (1349), Decameron.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Cesar, H.S.J. (1994). Cooperation in a Second-Best World: Technology Transfers and Issue Linkage. In: Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 416. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45738-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45738-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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