Abstract
Expounding the rate of return paradox as the upshot of legal restrictions amounts to taking an outside position of which most monetary economists disapprove. For example the following criticism has been voiced against this attempted explanation: It is a logical consequence of the erronous claim, that Walras’ tatonnement and his auctioneer mirror the real world. Once this claim has been accepted, a means of payment with a low nominal rate of return obviously has no place to occupy. If one nevertheless wants to have it in the model, then one is in a quandary. As a last resort, legal restrictions are invoked. In this view, generating a demand for money by means of legal restrictions resembles clutching at a straw. This objection is at best incomplete. It does not answer the question whether under laissez faire agents would choose a means of payment with a high interest rate, and what might induce them to forgo these high return rates.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schönfelder, B. (1992). The Rate of Return Paradox II: “Legal Restrictions”. In: Overlapping Structures as a Model of Money. Microeconomic Studies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45713-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45713-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-45715-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45713-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive