Abstract
Simple games are a most succinct description of the power structure induced by the decision procedures, focusing on winning — i.e. all-powerful — coalitions.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Vannucci, S. (1991). Noncooperative Capacities of Simple Games. In: Ricci, G. (eds) Decision Processes in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 353. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_11
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