Abstract
There are many theories of two-person bargaining games, but most of them do not seem to have much relevance for the explanation of laboratory experiments. This may be due to the fact, that most of the theories are normative rather than descriptive. Thousands of plays of different three-person games in characteristic function form have been evaluated at the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics. Some of the theoretical questions posed by this body of data already arise in two-person games. The experimental literature on two-person games does not offer a well supported descriptive theory.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1990 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Uhlich, G.R. (1990). Two-Person Bargaining Games. In: Descriptive Theories of Bargaining. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 341. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-52483-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45672-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive