Abstract
Our particular interest is in cooperative n-person games in characteristic function form with sidepayments. Before turning to the theories of coalition formation, we need to define the n-person games these theories address.
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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Uhlich, G.R. (1990). Notations and Definitions of Characteristic Function Games. In: Descriptive Theories of Bargaining. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 341. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-52483-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45672-5
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