Abstract
We show in this final chapter how a dynamics describing the time evolution of population states can be introduced for games with finitely many strategies. In Section 8.1, we study the relationship between uninvadability and another stability concept arising in this dynamical context. As it turns out, uninvadability implies dynamical stability (defined below), whereas evolutionary stability neither implies nor is implied by the dynamical stability concept; see, e.g. [van Damme 1987, p.226, Fig.9.4.4b], and Example 18 below.
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© 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bomze, I.M., Pötscher, B.M. (1989). Replicator dynamics. In: Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 324. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45660-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45660-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50766-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45660-2
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