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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 324))

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Abstract

How do certain inherited traits like behavioural patterns arise in a population? Why do some behavioural patterns exhibit a certain degree of stability over time whereas others do not? These questions are central in the theory of biological evolution. The concept of evolutionary stability introduced in [Maynard Smith/Price 1973] and [Maynard Smith 1974] provides a framework allowing for a formal analysis of these and related problems. (Forerunners of the idea of evolutionary stability can be found in [Fisher 1930], [Hamilton 1967], and [Stewart 1971].) The prime goal of such a theory is to model evolutionary processes in populations of interacting individuals and to explain why certain states of a given population are — in course of the selection process — stable against perturbations induced by mutations. In particular, an explanation is sought how stable polymorphisms of behaviour can arise in a population, as is observed, e.g., in certain mammal societies.

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© 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bomze, I.M., Pötscher, B.M. (1989). Introduction. In: Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 324. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45660-2_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45660-2_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50766-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45660-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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