Abstract
In chapter 5 the assumption of an exogenously given project and loan size for each borrower was replaced by the more appealing assumption that the return of the project is a positive, concave function of the loan size according to a conventional neoclassical production function. It turned out that changing from a deterministic to a stochastic world where the project return is a random variable leads to complications which require some restrictions on the random distributions concerned in order to keep the model ‘well behaved’. Then it was shown that even if appropriate assumptions are made no Nash-equi-librium may exist if there is asymmetric information about the abilities of borrowers.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Clemenz, G. (1986). Variable Loan Size, Signalling and Endogenous Information. In: Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 272. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45614-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45614-5_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16778-5
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