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Extensions and Modifications of the τ-Value for Cooperative Games

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Selected Topics in Operations Research and Mathematical Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 226))

Abstract

Tijs (1981) defined the τ-value only for a subclass of cooperative games in characteristic function form. In this paper an extension of the τ-value to the space of all games is given. Another solution concept, the core-value, is also introduced, which appears to coincide with the τ-value for games with a non-empty core. Properties of the τ-value and the core-value are given. Modifications of the τ-value with respect to the upper vector and the coalition structure are also treated.

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References

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© 1984 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Driessen, T.S.H., Tijs, S.H. (1984). Extensions and Modifications of the τ-Value for Cooperative Games. In: Hammer, G., Pallaschke, D. (eds) Selected Topics in Operations Research and Mathematical Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 226. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45567-4_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45567-4_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-12918-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45567-4

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