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Decision Concepts for Organizations

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Organizations: Multiple Agents with Multiple Criteria

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 190))

Abstract

Decision processes in organizations can formally be described as decision problems with several decision makers and different utility functions. Game and bargaining approaches have to be taken into account as solution methods. They are characterized by the actual decision rule which describes, or rather determines, the decision behaviour of the organization members. For this rule certain requirements are set up, the fullfilment of which gives information, how far the presented approaches are useful for determining optimal decisions in organizations.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fernuniversität Hagen, D-5800, Hagen 1, West Germany

    Günter Fandel

Authors
  1. Günter Fandel
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19711, USA

    Joel N. Morse

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© 1981 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Fandel, G. (1981). Decision Concepts for Organizations. In: Morse, J.N. (eds) Organizations: Multiple Agents with Multiple Criteria. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 190. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-10821-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45527-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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