Abstract
A number of counterexamples, or paradoxes, demonstrate that utility theory is not descriptive of human choice behavior. Here we examine the consequences of modelling a decision maker’s utility for a given outcome in terms of two attributes: strength of preference for the final asset position and a measure of “decision regret” (or happiness) over the ex-post evaluation of the decision made.
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References
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© 1981 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bell, D.E. (1981). Explaining Utility Theory Paradoxes by Decision Regret. In: Morse, J.N. (eds) Organizations: Multiple Agents with Multiple Criteria. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 190. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-10821-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45527-8
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